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The Second Amendment as a
Fundamental Right 
by TIMOTHY ZICK1*
Introduction 
The Second Amendment has been suffering from an inferiority 
complex.  Litigants, scholars, and judges have complained that the right to 
keep and bear arms is not being afforded the respect and dignity befitting a 
“fundamental” constitutional right.  They have asserted that, both on its own 
terms and relative to rights in the same general class, the Second Amendment 
has been disrespected, under-enforced, and orphaned.  They have argued that 
courts have treated the Second Amendment as “peripheral,” “fringe,” 
“anachronistic,” “second rate,” and “second-class.”2  The Second 
Amendment has been described as “the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill of 
        *     John Marshall Professor of Government and Citizenship, William & Mary Law School.  I 
would like to thank Joseph Blocher and Eric Ruben for providing thoughtful comments on a draft 
of the Article.  I would also like to thank the Giffords Law Center and the Hastings Constitutional 
Law Quarterly for organizing the symposium “Heller at 10: A Symposium on the Last – and Next 
– Decade of the Modern Second Amendment.” 
 1.  See, e.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
right to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court’s constitutional orphan.”); Peruta v. California, 
137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Second Amendment has been treated less favorably than other constitutional rights); Amicus 
Curiae Brief of National Rifle Association of America in Support of Petitioner at 22, Walker v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016) (No. 15-1027) (“The rights secured by the Second 
Amendment are not second-class rights, and this Court should grant certiorari to ensure that they 
are not relegated to that disfavored status.”). 
 2.  See Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willet, J., dissenting) 
(“Constitutional scholars have dubbed the Second Amendment ‘the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill 
of Rights.’  As Judge Ho relates, it is spurned as peripheral, despite being just as fundamental as 
the First Amendment.  It is snubbed as anachronistic, despite being just as enduring as the Fourth 
Amendment.  It is scorned as fringe, despite being just as enumerated as the other Bill of Rights 
guarantees.”); Robert J. Cottrol, Taking Second Amendment Rights Seriously, 26 HUM. RTS. 5, 5 
(Fall 1999) (“[T]he Second Amendment has become the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill of 
Rights . . . .”).  Note that the Cottrol article was published a decade before the Supreme Court 
recognized an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.  For those unfamiliar with the comedian 
Rodney Dangerfield and his “no respect” routine, see Rodney Dangerfield, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rodney_Dangerfield (last visited January 28, 2019). 
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622 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:3 
Rights” and even compared to Rosa Parks––i.e., a constitutional right that is 
forced to sit at “the back of our constitutional bus.”3
This Article assesses the full range of “second-class” claims.  I concede 
at the outset that comparisons across constitutional provisions, which most 
“second-class” claims invite or entail, are a complicated exercise.4  Among 
other things, they suggest some agreed-upon normative basis for determining 
whether or when particular rights are being disrespected or under-enforced. 
The baselines for making such claims are far from clear, and they involve 
contested normative judgments.5  However, judged according to all of the 
benchmarks at our disposal––conceptual, qualitative, quantitative, and 
doctrinal––“second-class” claims generally fall short. 
Indeed, reviewing the available evidence, the Article generally rejects 
“second-class” claims as either false or significantly overstated.  Many of the  
claims are based on false premises, including the notion that the Supreme 
Court and lower courts immediately and aggressively expand the scope of 
fundamental rights once they are recognized, that all fundamental rights are 
created and enforced equally, that the absence of strict scrutiny is 
demonstrative of lower-class status, and that low success rates demonstrate 
under-enforcement.6  As recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller7 and 
interpreted in the lower courts, the Second Amendment exhibits all the 
hallmarks of a fundamental constitutional right.  It is a non-economic, 
individual dignity right that is considered “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”8
 3.  See Cottrol, supra note 2.  See also John Yoo & James C. Phillips, The Second(-Class) 
Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/supreme-
court-second-amendment-rights/. 
 4.  See Darrell A. H. Miller, Romanticism Meets Realism in Second Amendment 
Adjudication, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE  33, 37 (2018) (observing that among other things such 
comparisons require controlling for variations among rights and rendering them 
“interchangeable”). 
 5.  Id. at 36–37 (“Inescapably, whether you think the Second Amendment is being over- or 
under-enforced, or optimally enforced, is a normative judgment dependent on other factors.”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267 (2007) 
(observing that strict scrutiny has not been a reliable or consistent indicator of fundamentality); 
Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L. J. 1434 (2018) (examining success rates in Second 
Amendment cases). 
 7.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 8.  See id. at 628–29.  See also McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761, 767 (2010) (quoting 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
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Spring 2019]           THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 623 
Constructed in the image of the Free Speech Clause and analogized in 
those terms by many courts,9 the right to keep and bear arms exerts a 
powerful influence on constitutional discourse and political outcomes.10  To 
be sure, success rates for Second Amendment claims have been low, and 
lower courts have not generally interpreted Heller broadly.  However, the 
available evidence does not show that either the results or the restraint are 
the product of judicial hostility, resistance, or political ideology.11  Indeed, 
many “second-class” claims appear to be disagreements with the merits of 
lower court interpretations of Heller or criticisms of the manner in which the 
Court itself defined and limited the right to keep and bear arms in the first 
place.  While it is true that Heller has been “narrowed from below,” it is not 
true that this narrowing was either unauthorized by the Supreme Court or 
unreasonable.12  Indeed, as Richard Re has observed, “even if lower courts 
have not adhered to the best reading of Heller, they have interpreted the 
decision reasonably.”13
As this Article is going to print, one of the standard “second-class” 
claims—that the Supreme Court has abandoned or “orphaned” the Second 
Amendment—has already been answered.14  While the Supreme Court has 
indeed been silent for a decade, thus leaving to lower courts the task of 
constructing Second Amendment doctrines, the Court has recently granted 
certiorari in a Second Amendment case.15  Even before the Court granted 
review, it was clear that the Court had not abandoned the Second 
Amendment for all time.16  Indeed, its decade-long silence was not 
exceptional.  Other fundamental rights have experienced greater 
 9.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582, 595 (invoking First Amendment); David B. Kopel & Joseph 
G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193 
(2017) (discussing court’s reliance on First Amendment in Second Amendment decisions).  
 10.  See generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014). 
 11.  See infra Parts II and III. 
 12.  Richard Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEORGETOWN L.J.
921, 961 (2016). 
 13.  Id. at 962. 
 14.  See Sanford Levinson, Comment on Ruben and Blocher: Too Damn Many Cases, and an 
Absent Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 17, 20 (2018) (“The oracular Court has maintained 
a resolute silence now for nearly a decade, while the notionally ‘inferior’ priesthood has been 
charged with providing answers to a plethora of concrete cases.”). 
 15.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, WL 271961.
 16.  See Josh Blackman, Justice Thomas: Second Amendment is not a ‘Second-Class Right,’
NAT’L REV. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428173/justice-thomas-
second-amendment-not-second-class-right-josh-blackman (“By refusing to intervene when lower 
courts disregard the right to keep and bear arms, the Supreme Court has done exactly what Chicago 
wanted, and abdicated this cornerstone of the Bill of Rights.”). 
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 65 Side B      02/26/2019   14:13:21
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 65 Side B      02/26/2019   14:13:21
ZICK_MACROED_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2019 5:21 PM
624 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:3 
abandonment, and some even apparent exile.  Thus, nothing about the 
Supreme Court’s post-Heller treatment of the Second Amendment suggested 
its “second-class” status.17
In short, if there were a “Rodney Dangerfield Award” for fundamental 
constitutional rights, the Second Amendment would not currently be a very 
strong contender.  In any event, our experience with fundamental rights 
shows that what courts have made of the Second Amendment in its first 
decade will not dictate what the right will become in subsequent decades.  
For firearms proponents, there are reasons to be optimistic in this regard.  
The Second Amendment’s inferiority complex has led to calls for 
recognition of a kind of super-right, one defined in absolute terms and 
buttressed by the most rigid standards.18  In light of the Second Amendment’s 
actual status, such exhortations represent a significant and ultimately unwise 
over-compensation.  Whatever it becomes, by whatever dynamics will 
ultimately affect it, the Second Amendment’s path should be determined 
according to an accurate assessment of both its actual and relative status 
among fundamental constitutional rights. Its development should not be the 
product of over-compensation by the Supreme Court. 
Part I provides a basic typology of the various “second-class” claims 
that have been advanced by litigants, scholars, and judges.  “Second-class” 
arguments may be largely strategic or rhetorical—a means of goading, or 
perhaps guilting, the Supreme Court into reviewing and invalidating laws 
that burden Second Amendment rights.19  Part I instead treats the claims as 
substantive and normative.  It identifies four types of “second-class” claims: 
conceptual, doctrinal, enforcement-related, and attitudinal.  Critics complain 
that the Second Amendment has not been properly conceptualized or defined 
as a fundamental right, has been subjected to “second-class” doctrinal 
treatment, has been under-enforced by courts; and has been marginalized and 
disrespected owing to judicial bias.  The remainder of the Article challenges 
these four general claims. 
 17.  See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro & Matthew Larosiere, The Supreme Court is too Gun-Shy on the 
Second Amendment, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-court-
is-too-gun-shy-on-the-second-amendment-11546473290.  The claim that the Supreme Court has 
“abandoned” the Second Amendment is discussed in Part V.D. 
 18.  See, e.g., Todd E. Petty, The N.R.A.’s Strict Scrutiny Amendments (U. Iowa Legal Studies 
Research, Paper No. 2018-17, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=324408 
1&download=yes (analyzing N.R.A. proposals to amend state constitutions to provide that Second 
Amendment burdens must survive strict scrutiny and describing them as an attempt to build “an 
iron wall around” gun rights). 
 19.  See Darrell A. H. Miller, The Second Amendment and Second-Class Rights, HARV. L.
REV. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-second-amendment-and-
second-class-rights/ (suggesting that such claims may be rhetorical). 
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Part II argues that judged according to traditional indicia of 
constitutional rights in general, and fundamental rights in particular, the 
Second Amendment has been conceived and defined as a fundamental right.  
In Heller itself and post-Heller lower court decisions, the Second 
Amendment has been conceptualized as a non-absolute, but strongly 
constituted, constitutional right that can sometimes trump ordinary policy 
concerns.  In these basic and minimal respects, at least, the Second 
Amendment bears the hallmarks of a fundamental constitutional right. 
Part III focuses on “second-class” enforcement claims.  It carefully 
reviews all of the available qualitative and quantitative literature on the 
subject of Second Amendment enforcement and concludes that the available 
evidence does not support several “second-class” enforcement claims.  The 
evidence does not support claims of outright hostility and widespread 
resistance to Heller or to Second Amendment claims and claimants.  It is the 
case that some lower court decisions express the sort of institutional concerns 
that sometimes indicate under-enforcement of constitutional norms.20
However, these statements are equally likely to be associated with principles 
of judicial restraint or judicial minimalism.  Further, Heller’s own 
ambiguities may be responsible for lower court reticence to expand Second 
Amendment rights beyond the parameters the Court established.  The data 
show that Second Amendment success rates are notably low.21  However, 
that fact alone does not demonstrate either under-enforcement of the right to 
keep and bear arms itself or a comparative disadvantage with regard to other 
constitutional rights.22  Evidence of ideological or attitudinal bias affecting 
Second Amendment claims is also weak.23  Finally, the evidence shows that 
in Second Amendment cases, courts are using standards and methodologies 
that are common to fundamental rights claims.24  The available data strongly 
suggest that the Second Amendment is being legalized and normalized as 
part of the Constitution’s existing system of fundamental rights.  That 
process will continue as the Supreme Court and lower courts decide more 
Second Amendment cases. 
Part IV more directly addresses claims that the Second Amendment has 
been treated as “second-class” relative to other fundamental constitutional 
 20.  See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
 21.  See, e.g., Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6. 
 22.  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 23.  See generally Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Are Commercial Speech Cases 
Ideological? An Empirical Inquiry, 25 WILL. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827 (2017) (observing that 
available empirical evidence does not support the claim that gun rights cases are politically 
charged).
 24.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6. 
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rights.  The claim that all fundamental rights are created and enforced on 
equal terms is demonstrably false.  Moreover, within the existing rights 
hierarchy, both on its own terms and relative to other fundamental rights in 
its class, the Second Amendment is hardly a B-list right.  To sharpen the 
comparative lens, the Part focuses in particular on a favorite comparator for 
Second Amendment “second-class” claimants—the Free Speech Clause.  It 
first compares the two rights in their respective first decades of enforcement.  
It then assesses “second-class” claims against contemporary free speech and 
other fundamental rights standards.  These comparisons offer important, but 
perhaps surprising, insights in terms of current arguments for “first-class” 
status on behalf of the Second Amendment.  One insight is that the real 
source of “second-class” claimants’ angst is Heller itself, which appears to 
articulate a rather narrow conception of the right to keep and bear arms.  
Another is that treating every law or regulation that incidentally burdens 
Second Amendment rights as subject to heightened scrutiny would provide 
favored, not equal, treatment for the right to keep and bear arms.  In short, it 
would produce an anomaly in the fundamental rights hierarchy: a kind of 
super-right.  The Part concludes with a critical assessment of the claims that 
the Second Amendment has been orphaned, abandoned, or neglected, 
particularly relative to other fundamental rights.  In this sense, as in others, 
“second-class” claims overreach. 
The Article’s Conclusion briefly looks forward to the Second 
Amendment’s second decade and beyond.  The substance and status of 
fundamental rights can change markedly over time.  The scope and meaning 
of the Second Amendment has not been settled in its first post-recognition 
decade, any more than the Free Speech Clause was forever defined by the 
same era.  The Supreme Court will soon clarify, and likely expand, the scope 
of the right to keep and bear arms.  However, like other rights in its class, the 
Second Amendment is not likely to become the absolute right that some 
advocates desire.  The right to keep and bear arms is likely to operate much 
as freedom of speech and other fundamental rights do—as a strong trump in 
some cases, but a right that is subject to certain limits in the name of other 
rights or public interests.  Those limits and interests ought to be carefully 
considered against a backdrop that paints an accurate picture of the Second 
Amendment in its first decade. 
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 67 Side A      02/26/2019   14:13:21
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 67 Side A      02/26/2019   14:13:21
ZICK_MACROED_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2019 5:21 PM
Spring 2019]           THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 627 
I.  A Typology of “Second-Class” Claims 
The claim that the Second Amendment is, or has been treated as, a 
“second-class” constitutional right takes many forms.25  This Part develops 
a basic typology of such claims.  It assumes that there is substance to the 
“second-class” claims—in other words, that they are not merely rhetorical 
or instrumental complaints intended to influence judicial or public opinion 
(although they may serve that purpose as well).26  “Second-class” arguments 
can be somewhat difficult to define and separate.  They are not always 
precisely drawn.  They also share in common a comparative component, 
which often suggests either (a) all fundamental rights are treated equally,27
or (b) there is indeed a hierarchy of rights and the Second Amendment has 
been improperly relegated to its cellar.28  The first of these complaints is 
demonstrably false, and the Article disputes the second.  In any event, some 
useful distinctions can be drawn and these allow for a holistic analysis of 
“second-class” claims.  There are four types or forms of “second-class” 
claim: conceptual, enforcement-related, doctrinal, and ideological.  This Part 
describes the basic claim types.  The remainder of the Article critically 
analyzes “second-class” claims in all their forms.
A.  Conceptual 
One version of the “second-class” critique is that the Second 
Amendment has not been properly conceptualized or defined as a 
fundamental constitutional right.  The basic complaint is that the Second 
Amendment has not been properly elevated, in conceptual terms, to 
“fundamental” status.29
 25.  See Miller, supra note 19 (suggesting that such claims may be rhetorical, descriptive, or 
normative).
 26.  See id. (suggesting that some “second-class” claims may be merely rhetorical). 
 27.  See Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (Thomas, J., with whom Gorsuch, J. joins, 
dissenting) (“The Constitution does not rank certain rights above others, and I do not think this 
Court should impose such a hierarchy by selectively enforcing its preferred rights.”). 
 28.  See Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 2, Bonidy v. United States Postal Service, 136 S. Ct. 1486 
(2016) (No. 15-746) (“This Court’s review is further warranted because the deferential form of 
intermediate scrutiny applied by the panel majority below is inconsistent with this Court’s 
precedents regarding how infringements on fundamental rights are analyzed and demonstrates how 
the lower courts are turning the Second Amendment into a second-class right.”). 
 29.  See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 945 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(Callahan, J., dissenting) (“The Second Amendment is not a ‘second-class’ constitutional 
guarantee.”); Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In 
construing the statute before us expansively so that causing a single minor reckless injury or 
offensive touching can lead someone to lose his right to bear arms forever, the Court continues to 
‘relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.’” (quoting Friedman v. City of Highland 
Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari))); Silvester v. 
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This form of “second-class” argument is based, in part, on the notion 
that constitutional rights––in particular “fundamental” rights––are part of a 
distinct class of rights.  These rights, which exhibit certain indicia of 
fundamentality, are entitled to special—and equal—treatment by courts.30
In its most extreme form, this form of “second-class” claim asserts that 
the Second Amendment is not being accorded the status of a “right” at all, in 
the sense that it does not constrain government action within its domain.  In 
its more particular form, the argument is that the Second Amendment has 
not been conceptualized as a strong trump on certain governmental actions. 
Rather, it has operated as one among many competing policy considerations 
that legislatures take into account.
These claims require a basic understanding of what it means to assert 
that something is, or is not, a constitutional “right.”  The more specific form 
assumes that there are common and agreed-upon indicia of fundamentality 
as the concept pertains to rights.  Conceptual and definitional claims, like 
other “second-class” arguments, have a comparative aspect.  They rest in 
part on the premise that relative to other rights of the same class, the Second 
Amendment has been conceptually misinterpreted or disfavored.
B.  Doctrinal
Another form of “second-class” argument focuses explicitly on 
doctrinal comparisons between the Second Amendment and other 
fundamental constitutional rights, including the First Amendment’s free 
speech right.  Critics have argued that Second Amendment doctrine, which 
has developed in the lower courts, is not appropriate for a fundamental 
right.31  Some have also asserted that the Supreme Court’s failure to clarify 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The right to keep and bear arms is apparently 
this Court’s constitutional orphan.”); Peruta, 137 S. Ct. at 1999 (“The Court’s decision to deny 
certiorari in this case reflects a distressing trend: the treatment of the Second Amendment as a 
disfavored right.”); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“I would grant certiorari to prevent the Seventh Circuit from relegating the Second 
Amendment to a second-class right.”).  See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–39, Voisine, 
136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (No. 14-10154); Josh Blackman, Justice Thomas Speaks Truth to Power: 
Second Amendment is not a Second-Class Right, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Mar. 1, 2016), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2016/03/01/justice-thomas-speaks-truth-to-power-second-
amendment-is-not-a-second-class-right/ (referring to a “rank double standard” and concluding that 
“Thomas’s questions from the bench are meant to illicit [sic] the subjugation of the Second 
Amendment”).
 30.  See, e.g., Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2018) (“we remain ever mindful 
not to treat the Second Amendment any differently from other individual rights.”). 
 31.  See Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 2, Bonidy, 136 S. Ct. 1486 (No. 15-746) (“This Court’s 
review is further warranted because the deferential form of intermediate scrutiny applied by the 
panel majority below is inconsistent with this Court’s precedents regarding how infringements on 
fundamental rights are analyzed and demonstrates how the lower courts are turning the Second 
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Spring 2019]           THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 629 
Second Amendment doctrines has disfavored or disadvantaged the right to 
keep and bear arms vis-à-vis other fundamental rights.32
Doctrinal “second-class” claims are related to enforcement claims, 
which are discussed below.33  The basic premise is that courts have applied 
more lenient doctrinal frameworks or standards to Second Amendment 
claims than either fundamental status dictates or a comparative assessment 
of like-situated fundamental rights reveals to be correct.34  This is part of the 
basis for the conceptual claim that the Second Amendment rests at or near 
the bottom of the Constitution’s fundamental rights hierarchy.  Through 
either active misinterpretation or neglect, critics have claimed, the Second 
Amendment has been doctrinally disfavored.
As we will see, like other “second-class” claims, comparative doctrinal 
claims pose analytical challenges.  While there are some overarching themes 
and methods, the Supreme Court has developed fundamental rights doctrines 
in an essentially ad hoc manner.  We can certainly rely on the existence of 
categorical rules, interest balancing, and levels of scrutiny to some degree.  
However, precise comparisons across fundamental rights are difficult.  
Nevertheless, we can identify and compare the doctrinal conceptions or 
methods that are articulated and held to apply to different fundamental rights.
Amendment into a second-class right.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Jackson v. City of 
San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015) (No. 14-704) (“[E]ven after this Court’s admonishment that 
the Second Amendment may not ‘be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—
treatment,’ courts continue to do just that.  Whether through summary reversal or plenary review, 
this Court should use this opportunity to put an end to this disturbing trend.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778–79 (2010))).
 32.  See Friedman, 136 S. Ct. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s refusal to review 
a decision that flouts two of our Second Amendment precedents stands in marked contrast to the 
Court’s willingness to summarily reverse courts that disregard our other constitutional decisions.”). 
As Justice Thomas wrote in another case: 
The Court has not heard argument in a Second Amendment case in over seven 
years—since March 2, 2010, in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).  Since 
that time, we have heard argument in, for example, roughly 35 cases where the 
question presented turned on the meaning of the First Amendment and 25 cases 
that turned on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  This discrepancy is 
inexcusable, especially given how much less developed our jurisprudence is with 
respect to the Second Amendment as compared to the First and Fourth 
Amendments.
Peruta, 137 S. Ct. at 1999 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 33.  See infra Part I.C. 
 34.  See Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799–800 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (“Second Amendment rights are no less protected by our Constitution than other 
rights enumerated in that document . . . .”).
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C.  Enforcement
A central “second-class” claim is that the lower courts, and again the 
Supreme Court by virtue of its neglect, have “underenforced” the Second 
Amendment in its first decade.35  This claim focuses primarily on actual 
results in court cases––wins and losses.  However, it is related to the 
conceptual and doctrinal claims, in the sense that the latter are presumably 
influencing case results.  Underenforcement has been a common refrain in 
petitions for certiorari.36  It has also been emphasized in academic 
literature.37
Enforcement claims rely heavily––although not exclusively––on the 
notably low success rates of Second Amendment claimants.  They also rely 
on things such as the “overall effect and tenor” of lower court decisions and 
an impression that courts are approaching Second Amendment claims with 
unwarranted skepticism.38  Some critics paint a rather dystopian vision of the 
 35.  See generally Sager, supra note 20 (discussing concept of under-enforced constitutional 
norms).
 36.  See, e.g., Brief for National Rifle Association of America as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Friedman, 136 S. Ct. 447 (No. 15-133) (“Rather than 
perform their duty to enforce the Constitution, lower courts are attempting to eradicate the Second 
Amendment by disregarding the Bill of Rights and the precedents of this Court.”); Brief for the 
American Civil Rights Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Kachalsky v. Cacace, 
133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (No. 12-845) (“The court below also embraced stepchild, second class status 
for the Second Amendment, contrary to both Heller and McDonald.”); Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 
2, Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (No. 15-746) (“This Court’s review is further 
warranted because the deferential form of intermediate scrutiny applied by the panel majority below 
is inconsistent with this Court’s precedents regarding how infringements on fundamental rights are 
analyzed and demonstrates how the lower courts are turning the Second Amendment into a second-
class right.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 
(2014) (No. 14-704) (“[E]ven after this Court’s admonishment that the Second Amendment may 
not ‘be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment,’ courts continue to do just 
that.  Whether through summary reversal or plenary review, this Court should use this opportunity 
to put an end to this disturbing trend.” (citation omitted) (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
561 U.S. 742, 778–79 (2010))); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. McCraw, 
134 S. Ct. 1365 (2014) (No. 13-390) (“We urge this Court to grant review in this case both to 
reaffirm that the Second Amendment’s guaranty is not a ‘second-class’ fundamental right and to 
establish that responsible, law-abiding 18-to-20-year-old adults are not second-class citizens.”). 
 37.  See, e.g., Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 9, at 196 (2017) (concluding, based on qualitative 
assessment, that lower courts are generally under-enforcing the Second Amendment); Robert J. 
Cottrol & George A. Mocsary, Guns, Bird Feathers, and Overcriminalization: Why Courts Should 
Take the Second Amendment Seriously, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 33 (2016) (arguing that 
lower courts are “undercutting . . . Supreme Court precedent” in a way that is suggestive of 
“something other than a desire to control crime”); Michael P. O’Shea, The Steepness of the Slippery 
Slope: Second Amendment Litigation in the Lower Federal Courts and What It Has to Do with 
Background Recordkeeping Legislation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1381, 1425 (2014) (characterizing the 
“tenor” of lower court Second Amendment decisions as “deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to 
claims that the Second Amendment limits government action”). 
 38.  See O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1409–10. 
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Second Amendment’s enforcement in the lower courts.  They argue that 
there is an “assault on gun rights” by lower courts, and accuse judges of 
effectively “rewriting” Heller.39  Some have even argued that lower courts 
have engaged in a form of “massive resistance” to Heller, and suggested that 
they are in open rebellion against the Court’s decision.40  Finally, some have 
placed the problem of under-enforcement at the feet of the Supreme Court.  
They argue that the Court has been complicit, owing to the fact that in the 
face of lower court resistance it has “abdicated” its judicial role by failing to 
intervene and defend Heller and McDonald.41
 Like other “second-class” claims, under-enforcement argument 
assume––but generally do not state or provide––a comparative benchmark.  
Thus, there is presumably some level of Second Amendment enforcement 
that “second-class” critics would consider appropriate or optimal.  In order 
to make comparisons, there is also presumably an optimal enforcement level 
for other fundamental rights.  It is possible to compare success rates across 
constitutional rights claims.  However, without the requisite benchmarks, 
these comparisons cannot demonstrate underenforcement.  That does not 
mean they are wholly unedifying.  Along with success rates, they represent 
evidence to consider in terms of how and when the right to keep and bear 
arms is being enforced.
39.  See, e.g., Editorial, Waiting for Justice Gorsuch, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/waiting-for-justice-gorsuch-1487893991 [https://perma.cc/VCU6-
SBYS] (referring to a “lower-court assault on gun rights”); Charles C. W. Cooke, The Fourth 
Circuit Runs Roughshod Over Heller and the Second Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 22, 2017), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445145/fourth-circuit-decision-maryland-assault-
weapons-ban-constitutional-travesty [https://perma.cc/349K-XLAC] (suggesting “the Fourth 
Circuit has taken it upon itself to rewrite Heller”).
 40.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 
(2015) (No. 15-133); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (No. 13-827)
(describing “lower courts’ massive resistance to Heller”); Alice Marie Beard, Resistance by 
Inferior Courts to Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 673, 673 
(2014) (“In the wake of the Supreme Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller (‘Heller I’) and 
McDonald v. Chicago decisions that clarify, expand, and protect Second Amendment rights, federal 
and state inferior courts have been engaging in massive resistance.” (citations omitted)); Editorial, 
Massive Gun Resistance, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/ articles/SB 
10001424127887324600704578402760760473.  Commentators have drawn explicit comparisons 
between post-Heller decisions and resistance to the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education. See Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 223, 
224 (2014); David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms Commerce?, 127 
HARV. L. REV. F. 230, 230 (2014).  See also Cottrol & Mocsary, supra note 37, at 30 (claiming 
that some courts have “defied decades of fundamental rights jurisprudence”).
 41.  See Blackman, supra note 16 (“By refusing to intervene when lower courts disregard the 
right to keep and bear arms, the Supreme Court has done exactly what Chicago wanted, and 
abdicated this cornerstone of the Bill of Rights.”).
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Notwithstanding these concerns, it is possible to assess certain aspects 
of “second-class” enforcement claims, including the importance of the 
overall success rate and factors influencing that rate.42  One thing this 
evidence shows is that merely tabulating wins and losses does not suffice to 
demonstrate that the Second Amendment has been under-enforced.  Another 
is that focusing solely on court decisions does not account for sub-
constitutional legislation that, at present, strongly supports gun rights.43
D.  Ideological
Arguments about the tone, tenor, or hostility of lower court decisions 
point to a final form of “second-class” claim.  Ideological claims posit that 
judges have viewed and treated the Second Amendment as “second-class” 
owing to partisan attitudes or personal biases.  In other words, they assert 
that judges are predisposed to rule against Second Amendment claimants, 
and may even view the claimants themselves as “second-class.”
Some critics assert that biases rooted in partisan ideology consign the 
Second Amendment to second-tier status.  One form of this argument is that 
the low success rate for Second Amendment claims can be traced to the 
political party of the president who nominated the judge deciding the case.44
There are other measures of partisan ideology, but the basic claim is that 
ideology is driving the Second Amendment down.
Others point to class-based biases, specifically the purported elitism of 
judges on the federal bench.  Thus, Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds claims 
that the relative lack of protection for Second Amendment rights stems from 
the fact that federal judges are drawn from an elite, educated, privileged pool 
of individuals who do not hold such rights in high regard.  He argues that the 
Second Amendment is regarded as second-class by “members of the 
chattering class,” who care more about things like freedom of speech than 
gun rights.45  According to Professor Reynolds, protection for gun rights has 
come almost exclusively from “the two branches of the government that are 
not reserved for wealthy people with postgraduate degrees.”46  Professor 
Sanford Levison articulated a similar criticism long before Heller, arguing 
 42.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6. 
 43.  See Miller, supra note 4, at 39–40 (observing that states and localities express political 
sentiments about the appropriate scope of gun rights). 
 44.  See O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1421 (claiming that lower court decisions reveal “a 
profound partisan divide”).  But see Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 861 (concluding that 
ideology “might play a small role” in resolving gun rights claims).
 45.  Heller: Past, Present, and Future, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 361, 367 (Spring, 2018) 
(comments of Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds).  
 46.  Id.
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that the “elite” bar and legal academy had declined to embrace a robust 
interpretation of the Second Amendment.47
These arguments might be considered possible causal explanations for 
“second-class” enforcement of the Second Amendment.  The typology treats 
them as a separate genre of claim, however, owing to the fact that they 
represent an alleged perspective on the Second Amendment that views the 
right to keep and bear arms as less legitimate than other fundamental rights.
II.  The Second Amendment as a “Fundamental Right” 
As discussed in Part II, a general complaint, common to all of forms of 
“second-class” arguments, is that the Second Amendment is not being 
accorded the dignity, respect, and regard typically shown fundamental 
constitutional rights.  This begs a few preliminary, but important, questions.  
What does it mean to say that something is a constitutional “right”? What 
does it mean to assert that a constitutional right is “fundamental”?  The point 
of asking these questions is not to engage deeply with philosophical or 
theoretical accounts of rights.  However, in order to have a general 
framework for understanding the various types of “second-class” claims, we 
ought first to identify the indicia or standards relating to the purported class 
of rights to which the Second Amendment belongs. 
A.  Constitutional Rights – Conceptions and Characteristics 
It might seem self-evident that the individual right to keep and bear 
arms has been defined and conceptualized as a fundamental constitutional 
right.  After all, Heller expressly recognized the right and McDonald
described it as “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and hence 
applicable to the states.  Yet some forms of “second-class” argument appear 
to be based on the idea that there is something different, and less favorable, 
about (in particular) judicial perceptions of the Second Amendment. 
Some of these complaints relate to Heller itself, which arguably 
recognized a relatively narrow constitutional right.  Understanding, in broad 
terms, what constitutional rights are can help contextualize the Second 
Amendment as a constitutional right.  There is a vast and growing 
philosophical literature on moral and legal rights.  It is not my intention to 
open that can of worms.  The focus here will be far more general in nature.  
The idea is to start from first and general principles, and then progress to 
more specific aspects of “second-class” claims. 
As Professor Fred Schauer recently observed, “the common positive 
law approach to rights, an approach seemingly reflected in our ordinary 
 47.  Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989). 
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discourse about rights, is to formulate rights in somewhat general terms but 
to understand the rights as so formulated as subject to being overridden or 
outweighed by other and especially weighty considerations.”48 In a general 
sense, Heller defined and conceptualized the Second Amendment in this 
manner—i.e., in general terms and subject to certain exceptions.  Thus, for 
example, the decision observed that only firearms in “common use” are 
protected, felons can be dispossessed of firearms, and firearms can be banned 
in “sensitive places” such as schools.49 Heller explicitly rejected so-called 
“interest balancing” in Second Amendment cases.50  However, it also took 
care to describe the right being recognized as one that is not absolute.51  Thus, 
in common with other rights, the right to keep and bear arms can seemingly 
be overridden—either by competing or conflicting individual rights or by 
public concerns. 
As discussed below, this is essentially what Ronald Dworkin appeared 
to mean when he once described constitutional rights as “trumps.”52
Dworkin defined constitutional rights as moral claims against government, 
subject to override in some instances, but only for very weighty reasons.53
To be sure, the degree to which the Second Amendment acts as a “trump” 
remains a point of very serious contention.  However, Heller and McDonald
both made clear that the Second Amendment cannot be traded off in ways 
that, say, non-rights may be.  Thus, for example, an individual has a right to 
keep and bear arms in the home for self-defense—seemingly regardless of 
the dangers or harms a political community might ascribe to this particular 
activity.  The same obviously cannot be said of all forms of activity engaged 
in within the home. 
Professor Jack Balkin has offered a different perspective on the 
meaning of constitutional rights.  He conceptualizes constitutional rights as 
“a form of discourse, a way of thinking about the needs of social order and 
human liberty in the context of a changing world.”54  According to Balkin, 
constitutional rights are also “a source of power—first, because they are a 
powerful form of rhetorical appeal, and second, because the enforcement of 
 48.  Frederick Schauer, Rightful Deprivations of Rights 9 (Va. Public L. and Legal Research 
Paper No. 2018-43, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3221184.  
 49.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 50.  Id. at 635.  
 51.  See id. at 626. 
 52.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).  For a critique of the 
conception of rights as “trumps,” see generally Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 28 (2018). 
 53.  DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 191. 
 54.  Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 53 (2004). 
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rights recognized by the state is backed up the power of the state.”55  This 
characterization of rights as a source of power helps to explain why so much 
energy is devoted to advocating and defending on behalf of constitutional 
rights.  As Balkin observes: “For the discourse of rights is the discourse of 
power, the restructuring of rights is the restructuring of power, and the 
securing of rights is the securing of power.”56
The Second Amendment has clearly been conceptualized as a 
constitutional right in these respects as well.  It is, and has been for some 
time, an important part of American cultural, political, and constitutional 
discourses.  The American public broadly supports the right recognized in 
Heller.57  As a result, the Second Amendment has substantial rhetorical 
appeal.  Indeed, some commentators have expressed the concern that Second 
Amendment rhetoric has contributed to dysfunctional policy debates 
concerning gun rights and gun control.58
Whether or not that is so, there is no denying the force of Second 
Amendment arguments.  Like other constitutional rights, the Second 
Amendment has been “a terrain of struggle in a world of continuous 
change.”59  Thus far, firearms proponents have been able to cash in on the 
rhetorical power of the right to keep and bear arms.  One measure of their 
success has been legislative receptiveness to Second Amendment arguments 
and appeals.  Particularly in state legislatures, the right to keep and bear arms 
has been treated as anything but “second-class.”60  Countless state laws 
preserve and protect Second Amendment rights, and legislatures in many 
states are deterred from passing gun control measures.  Whatever problems 
Second Amendment claims may be experiencing in courts in terms of 
claimant success rates, strong majoritarian preferences have produced a 
markedly different narrative in state and federal legislatures.61
 55.  Balkin, supra note 54, at 53–54. 
 56.  Id. at 54. 
 57.  This was true even prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller. See Jeffrey M. Jones, 
Americans in Agreement With Supreme Court on Gun Rights, GALLUP (June 26, 2008), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/108394/americans-agreement-supreme-court-gun-rights.aspx (noting 
that three in four Americans polled agreed that the Second Amendment protects an individual right 
to keep and bear arms). 
 58.  See Blocher, supra note 10.  See also Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the 
Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better 
Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569 (2006); Dan Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory 
Manifesto,” 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2003). 
 59.  Balkin, supra note 54, at 57. 
 60.  See Blocher, supra note 10, at 814 (noting Heller’s effect on passage of gun control laws). 
 61.  Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution Outside the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry,” 26 VAL.
U. L. REV. 437 (1992). 
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Like other constitutional rights, the right to keep and bear arms, again 
as defined in Heller and in state and federal laws, is backed by the power and 
authority of the state.  The National Rifle Association and other civic groups 
stand committed to defending and expanding Second Amendment rights, 
which are part of a broad constitutional movement that produced Heller and 
McDonald.62  The movement has an obvious strategic interest in convincing 
its participants and others that Second Amendment rights have been 
mistakenly conceptualized as “second-class.”  However, the Second 
Amendment bears the basic hallmarks of other rights in the broad class of 
constitutional rights. 
B.  Indicia of Fundamentality 
“Second-class” claimants may assert that although it has the basic 
characteristics of other constitutional rights, the Second Amendment has not 
been conceptualized as a “fundamental” constitutional right.  This claim 
concedes that certain rights are treated as special, in terms of their 
recognition, prestige, and enforcement.  It belies the notion that all rights are 
created equal, or that the Supreme Court has never ranked constitutional 
rights.  In fact, the ranking of constitutional rights has long been a central 
aspect of our constitutional jurisprudence. 
How, then, are we to determine which rights are conceived of as special 
or “fundamental”?  Dictionary definitions can be misleading, if not 
downright inaccurate.  According to Merriam-Webster, for example, a 
“fundamental right” is “a right that is considered by a court (as the U.S. 
Supreme Court) to be explicitly or implicitly expressed in a constitution (as 
the U.S. Constitution).”63  A Note accompanying the definition states: “A 
court must review a law that infringes on a fundamental right under a 
standard of strict scrutiny.  A fundamental right can be limited by a law only
if there is a compelling state interest.”64
Both the definition and accompanying Note are incorrect.  Not all rights 
that are expressed, either explicitly or implicitly, in the U.S. Constitution are 
treated as “fundamental.”  Even with respect to those deemed worthy of the 
label, as discussed below “strict scrutiny” is not always—or indeed even 
typically—the governing standard.65  A law student who relied on this 
 62.  DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2015). 
 63.  THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY NEW EDITION (2016). 
 64.  Id.
 65.  See Fallon, supra note 6 (observing that strict scrutiny has not been a reliable or consistent 
indicator of fundamentality). 
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particular definition and understanding of “fundamental” rights on a 
constitutional law exam would not do very well. 
At the same time, even the most astute law students and lawyers might 
reasonably be confused about the correct definition.  The problem, as one 
commentator has observed, is that “the Supreme Court has never bothered to 
define with any precision what counts as a ‘fundamental right.’”66  As 
another scholar has noted, there is no single “unifying principle for assessing 
the fundamentality of rights.”67  Rather, fundamental rights jurisprudence is 
the product of “a pastiche of constitutional interpretation.”68
Three general standards or indicia of fundamentality have been 
expressed or implied by the Supreme Court: 
First, following footnote four of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., we might consider all of the individual rights 
guaranteed in the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights to 
be fundamental.  Second, we might alternatively view all of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated to 
apply against the states to be fundamental; the test for 
incorporation asks if a right is fundamental to American political 
institutions and our system of justice.  Finally, we might define 
as fundamental those rights that have been thought of as 
‘preferred rights’ because of their role in promoting human 
dignity or democratic self-government.69
When applying these various approaches, the Court has relied on 
analogies and precedents to populate or round out the category of 
“fundamental” rights.  Thus, insofar as a right resembles or shares the 
characteristics of a right already recognized as fundamental, it is more likely 
to be accorded the same status. 
We could also take a more philosophical approach to defining 
fundamentality.  Again following Ronald Dworkin, we might say that 
 66.  Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 227, 228 (2006). 
 67.  Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 MIAMI
L. REV. 101, 106 (2002).
 68.  Id. at 112. The problem appears to be universal.  See W. Kent Davis, Answering Justice 
Ginsburg’s Charge That the Constitution Is ‘Skimpy’ in Comparison to Our International 
Neighbors: A Comparison of Fundamental Rights in American and Foreign Law, 39 S. TEX. L.
REV. 951, 954 (1998) (noting that the terms “human rights,” “freedoms,” “fundamental human 
rights,” “fundamental freedoms,” “rights and freedoms,” and “fundamental rights” appear to be 
used interchangeably around the world).
 69.  Winkler, supra note 66, at 228 (internal citations omitted). 
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although not all constitutional rights represent moral rights of sufficient 
weight to constrain government in most circumstances, “those Constitutional 
rights that we call fundamental like the right of free speech, are supposed to 
represent rights against the Government in the strong sense; that is the point 
of the boast that our legal system respects the fundamental rights of the 
citizen.”70  For Dworkin, these rights “mark off and protect” a category of 
distinctive interests, and hence cannot typically be sacrificed to majority 
preferences or considerations of general utility.71  Hence they prevail “over 
the kind of trade-off argument that normally justifies political action.”72  In 
sum, a constitutional right might be considered “fundamental” if in at least 
some circumstances it operates as a strong trump against governmental 
action.
Whatever standard one adopts, the Second Amendment as conceived in 
Heller and McDonald readily qualifies as “fundamental.”  First, it is among 
the rights expressly listed in the Bill of Rights.  As the Court has indicated, 
all such rights are presumptively fundamental. 
Second, the right to keep and bear arms is also “fundamental” under the 
Court’s “incorporation” doctrine.73  Under that doctrine, which the Court has 
used to determine which provisions of the Bill of Rights are to be applied to 
states and localities as well as the national government, the Court asks 
whether the right is considered to be “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” or “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”74 In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme 
Court held that the individual right to keep and bear arms recognized in 
Heller was fundamental according to these standards.75  The Court rejected 
the government’s arguments to the contrary, expressly characterizing them 
as a plea to treat the Second Amendment as a “second-class” right.76  This, 
said the Court, would be “inconsistent with the long-established standard we 
apply in incorporation cases.”77
 70.  DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 191. 
 71.  RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
POLITICAL DEBATE 31 (2006).
 72.  Id.
 73.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–67 (discussing development of 
“incorporation” doctrine).  
 74.  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
105 (1934). 
 75.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–68 (holding that Second Amendment right is fundamental 
and thus incorporated against states).  
 76.  Id. at 180. 
 77.  Id. at 181. 
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Not exactly. Under the incorporation standard, not all of the rights 
expressly provided for in the Bill of Rights are considered “fundamental.”  
Although Justice Black encouraged his colleagues to incorporate the Bill of 
Rights provisions in toto, the Court declined to do so, engaging instead in a 
process of “selective” incorporation.78  Under this approach, the Third 
Amendment’s protection against quartering of soldiers, the Fifth 
Amendment’s grand jury indictment requirement, the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial in civil cases, and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
on excessive fines are not yet considered “fundamental.”79  Thus, some Bill 
of Rights provisions are indeed “second-class,” at least from an 
incorporation standpoint.  However, McDonald makes quite clear that the 
Second Amendment is not among them. 
Third, Heller and McDonald recognized a relation between personal 
self-defense, individual autonomy, and the right to keep and bear arms.  In 
that respect, the Second Amendment right resembles other (un-enumerated) 
fundamental rights such as abortion, contraception, and marriage.  It is a right 
related to the preservation of life, and hence of human dignity. Although 
Heller and McDonald characterized the core of the Second Amendment right 
in terms of self-defense, it did not rule out additional justifications.  For 
instance, the Second Amendment might be characterized as a “political 
process” right entitled to special consideration by the courts, in the sense that 
it preserves citizen self-government in the face of tyrannical state actions. 
Finally, under the Dworkinian conception of fundamentality, Heller
created a strong moral claim of right.  With regard, at least, to regulations of 
commonly kept firearms used for self-defense in the home, the rights-bearing 
individual has a “trump” or strong claim that cannot be outweighed by 
ordinary political considerations.  This means that courts can and will 
invalidate laws that burden or infringe upon such activity.  This conception 
does not mean the Second Amendment protects only such actions, but rather 
that it is most likely to operate as a strong “trump” against state burdens or 
infringements as to this aspect of the right.  And this, indeed, is how Heller
defined the Second Amendment right––not in terms of its totality, but in 
terms of its core, with future construction to follow. 
Another indication that the Second Amendment has been 
conceptualized or defined as “fundamental” relates to the fact that it was 
fashioned in the image of the undoubtedly “first-class” free speech right set 
forth in the First Amendment.  Heller sought to burnish the Second 
Amendment’s “fundamental” status by analogy. 
 78.  See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (1947) (Black, J., 
dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
79.  See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13 (discussing non-incorporated rights provisions). 
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The Heller Court enhanced the Second Amendment’s historical 
pedigree by explicitly comparing its origins to those of the First Amendment.  
Both provisions, the Court asserted, codified pre-existing rights, and both 
were the product of a long dormancy followed by renewed judicial 
engagement.80
The Court also invoked the Free Speech Clause in addressing the 
Second Amendment’s scope.  It observed that just as the Free Speech 
Clause’s protection extends to modern forms of communication (such as 
speech on the Internet), so too must the Second Amendment’s scope extend 
beyond the types of arms available at the founding.81  At the same time, the 
Court observed that the Second Amendment, again like the First 
Amendment, does not protect all exercises of the right.82  Both rights are 
considered fundamental, but non-absolute. 
Finally, in terms of methodology, the Court rejected calls for an 
interest-balancing approach to Second Amendment rights—i.e., a weighing 
of the individual’s right to keep and bear arms against the state’s interests in 
regulating such activities.83  Once again, the majority opinion invoked the 
free speech example: “The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech 
guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, 
libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely 
unpopular and wrong-headed views.  The Second Amendment is no 
different.”84  The Court also rejected any form of “rationality” review for 
Second Amendment burdens, arguing that this form of low-level review had 
never been applied in the free speech context.85
As noted, fundamentality-by-analogy is a common way to establish the 
fundamental status of a constitutional right.  The Court’s effort to associate 
the Second Amendment with the First Amendment has borne considerable 
fruit.  In construing the Second Amendment, many lower courts and scholars 
 80.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592, 625–26 (2008).  
 81.  Id. at 582. 
 82.  Id. at 595. 
 83.  As commentators predicted, however, some interest balancing was inevitable. See Joseph 
Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 375, 381–83 (2009) (explaining distinction between categoricalism and balancing 
approaches and how this might affect interpretation of Second Amendment); Mark Tushnet, Heller
and the Perils of Compromise,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 421–22 (2009) (explaining that 
some balancing in Second Amendment doctrine is inevitable). 
 84.  Heller, 561 U.S. at 635. 
 85.  Id. at 628 n.27. 
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have expressly invoked the First Amendment’s doctrines and principles.86
Following Heller’s lead, they have borrowed aspects of the First Amendment 
to model the Second Amendment. 
In sum, the Second Amendment has been conceptualized and defined 
as a fundamental constitutional right under all of the existing standards and 
approaches.  The right to keep and bear arms, which operates as a strong 
“trump” at its core, has been recognized as “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” and characterized as central to personal dignity and self-defense.  It 
has been compared to, and indeed modeled upon, the First Amendment’s 
free speech guarantee.  Given that the Supreme Court and many lower courts 
have conceived of the Second Amendment in these explicit terms, 
conceptual and definitional “second-class” claims fall flat. 
Despite all these considerations, some “second-class” critics maintain 
that the Second Amendment has not been conceived of as “fundamental” in 
an important respect.  Specifically, they argue that an important aspect of 
fundamentality has generally been missing from lower court decisions––
namely, application of a “strict scrutiny” standard.  As discussed further 
below, it is true that lower courts have not regularly applied that level or 
degree of scrutiny to firearms regulations.  The reasons for this are varied, 
and will be addressed. 
At the conceptual or definitional level, the strict scrutiny argument is 
inherently flawed.  For one thing, as noted earlier, the argument that 
fundamental status automatically triggers strict judicial scrutiny is 
descriptively false.87  Thus, with regard to all of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, the Court has applied strict scrutiny in the context of only two rights–
–the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.88  And even in those two 
contexts, strict scrutiny has not been consistently applied.89  Thus, for 
example, content-neutral regulations of speech are subject to an intermediate 
standard of review.90  So are regulations of commercial speech.91  To take 
another example, under the Free Exercise Clause, neutral and generally 
applicable laws that burden religious exercise are essentially treated as 
 86.  See TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS 
RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 210–26 (2018) (examining the intersection of free 
speech and Second Amendment doctrines). 
 87.  See Fallon, supra note 6 (noting that strict scrutiny has not been a reliable or consistent 
indicator of fundamental rights status or enforcement). 
 88.  Winkler, supra note 66, at 229. 
 89.  Id. at 232. 
 90.  E.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (adopting a framework for 
analyzing such regulations that is more lenient than strict scrutiny). 
 91.  E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566–72 
(1980) (applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to commercial expression). 
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unreviewable or subject to minimal judicial scrutiny.92  In sum, very few of 
the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights actually trigger strict scrutiny.93
Nor have burdens on other fundamental rights relating to personhood 
and dignity, including the right to vote, the right to marry, and the right to 
privacy, generally given rise to strict scrutiny.94  With regard to privacy 
rights rooted in the Due Process Clause, only Roe v. Wade recognized a 
fundamental right that, at least initially, involved a strict scrutiny standard.95
This specific aspect of Roe was later overruled in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, which substituted the “undue burden” standard for strict scrutiny and 
did not explicitly characterize the right to abortion as “fundamental.”96
“Incidental” burdens on these and other fundamental rights receive either a 
lower level of scrutiny or in some cases none at all.97  Finally, certain classes 
of claimants, including convicted felons, can have their fundamental rights 
burdened or denied altogether under a form of rationality review.98
As some commentators have observed, the myth that strict scrutiny 
applies in the case of fundamental rights is rhetorically useful.  For instance, 
as James Fleming and Linda McClain have argued, it has been used by 
opponents of substantive due process to discourage recognition and 
protection for fundamental privacy and autonomy rights.99  Today, the strict 
scrutiny myth is being used by proponents of gun rights, who are demanding 
that burdens on such rights be treated with a “first-class” strict scrutiny 
standard rather than some watered-down “second-class” level of judicial 
review.100  However, the argument relies on the same debunked myth––that 
strict scrutiny applies whenever fundamental constitutional rights are 
implicated or burdened. 
 92.  Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 93.  Winkler, supra note 66, at 233 (noting that “there is no strict scrutiny found in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, Sixth Amendment doctrine, or in the case law emerging from the 
incorporated provisions of the Eighth Amendment”).
 94.  Id. at 236. 
 95.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973). 
 96.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 876 (1993). 
 97.  Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 
(1996)
 98.  See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 99.  James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty: Rights With 
Responsibilities and Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 849, 862–63 (2014) [hereinafter Fleming & 
McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty].  See also JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED
LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 267–69 (2013) [hereinafter FLEMING &
MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY].  
 100.  See Fleming & McClain, Ordered Gun Liberty, supra note 99, at 863–64 (discussing 
strict scrutiny arguments in Second Amendment context). 
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The Second Amendment’s relationship to strict scrutiny remains 
unclear. Heller made clear that the right to keep and bear arms was, like 
other fundamental rights, not an absolute guarantee.  However, it recognized 
that the core right of self-defense was to be preserved.  As we will see, some 
lower courts have interpreted this to mean that burdens on the “core” of the 
Second Amendment right are subject to strict scrutiny.  What about other 
burdens? Heller expressly rejected a general “interest balancing” approach, 
but also did not assign any standard of scrutiny to be applied in Second 
Amendment cases. 
The Court’s rejection of interest balancing is in tension with its strong 
reliance on the First Amendment’s free speech right, application of which 
frequently involves that very methodology.101  Thus, if lower courts are 
applying standards of review that invite interest balancing, have they really 
conceived of the Second Amendment as less than “fundamental” relative to 
rights like the freedom of speech? 
As free speech doctrines show, interest balancing may be consistent 
with fundamentality.  Professor Dworkin, who characterized fundamental 
rights as “trumps,” did not rule out some balancing.  Indeed, he expressly 
disagreed with the position “that the State is never justified in overriding [a 
fundamental] right.”102  Dworkin conceded that the government might 
override a fundamental right “when necessary to protect the rights of others, 
or to prevent a catastrophe, or even to obtain a clear and major public 
benefit.”103  What the government cannot do, he asserted, is override such a 
right “on the minimal grounds that would be sufficient if no such right 
existed.”104  Thus, Dworkin appeared to allow for both limiting constructions 
of fundamental constitutional rights and, in some cases, the balancing of 
collective interests against moral claims of right. 
What “trumps” appear to do, in the case of fundamental rights, is to 
increase the government’s burden for overriding the right.  In other words, 
fundamentality provides a form of special protection for, or extra weighting 
of, particular rights.  Once a right qualifies as “fundamental,” a priority is 
established in its favor and competing collective interests are generally 
required to yield.105  This conception of fundamentality suggests that the 
degree of special protection or weight does not have to be uniform.  Thus, 
rights can be characterized as “stronger” or “weaker,” depending on the 
 101.  See Blocher, supra note 82, at 379 (noting the parallel concerns in the First Amendment 
and Second Amendment contexts). 
 102.  DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 191. 
 103.  Id.
 104.  Id. at 191–92. 
 105.  Id. at 197–98. 
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justifications deemed sufficient to override them.  As one commentator 
explains, “courts employ a host of standards and categorical rules in 
fundamental rights cases, with strict scrutiny only used from time to time.”106
As discussed further below, this accurately describes the current system 
of fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution.  Heller and McDonald
adopted this general understanding of fundamentality.  The decisions 
recognized a non-absolute individual right to keep and bear arms.  They 
characterized a number of restrictions on the right as “presumptively 
lawful.”107  Although both Heller and McDonald disclaim interest balancing, 
the Court recognized some exceptions to Second Amendment coverage.  
These appear to be based, in part, on a weighing of interests.  For example, 
the presence of firearms in “sensitive places” is presumably not only an 
historical anomaly, but also a public safety hazard. 
III.  Second Amendment Enforcement 
Part II addressed some conceptual and definitional claims concerning 
the status of the Second Amendment.  However, many “second-class” claims 
focus in particular on how the Second Amendment has been enforced in the 
lower courts and, to a lesser degree, by the Supreme Court.  Although it does 
not definitively refute underenforcement claims, a systematic review of the 
available evidence shows that the Second Amendment has been enforced in 
a manner commensurate with its status as a fundamental constitutional right.  
This conclusion applies, in particular, to the doctrines and standards used in 
Second Amendment cases.  Although the low success rate of Second 
Amendment claims raises underenforcement concerns, it does not 
demonstrate that the right to keep and bear arms is being disfavored, 
discriminated against, or actively resisted by the lower courts.  Indeed, it is 
just as plausible to assert that lower courts have interpreted Heller’s various 
lacunae reasonably.108
A.  Qualitative Studies 
The Second Amendment’s power and influence as a constitutional right 
extends beyond the courtroom.  Legislatures that support Second 
 106.  Winkler, supra note 66, at 239.  As Professor Winkler observes, “the old adage about 
laws infringing fundamental rights being subject to strict scrutiny remains a favorite of scholars, 
judges, and law students.  And it is flatly wrong . . .  It is time the fundamental truth be told: laws 
infringing upon fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny, but only some of those rights, only 
some of the time, and only when challenged by some people.”  Id.
 107.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 n.26 (2008). 
 108.  See Re, supra note 12, at 962 (“But even if lower courts have not adhered to the best 
reading of Heller, they have interpreted the decision reasonably.”). 
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Amendment rights do not pass laws restricting the right to keep and bear 
arms.  Indeed, many have enacted significant protections that go beyond 
what Heller suggests.  Thus, in assessing its enforcement, it is somewhat 
artificial to focus solely on how the Second Amendment has fared in the 
courts.  Nevertheless, many “second-class” critics have complained 
specifically about this particular aspect of Second Amendment enforcement. 
Because the Supreme Court has not revisited the actual substance of the 
Second Amendment right since Heller, it has fallen to the lower courts to 
construct the constitutional rules and doctrines that govern the regulation of 
firearms in the United States.109  During the past decade, courts have decided 
more than one thousand cases involving Second Amendment rights.110  We 
now have both qualitative and quantitative evidence bearing on the “second-
class” enforcement issue.  This Section provides a critical review of the 
available qualitative literature, while the next Section focuses on existing 
quantitative studies. 
Qualitative analyses generally conclude that lower courts have enforced 
the Second Amendment in a manner that reflects a “second-class” status.111
Some of those analyses have been impressionistic, thus providing relatively 
weak or thin evidence of “second-class” enforcement.  Others have been 
more holistic and detailed, but still fall short of demonstrating significant 
deviations in terms of fundamental rights doctrines and standards. 
One study concludes, based on a brief review of only three federal 
courts of appeals cases involving challenges to public carry laws, that courts 
are under-enforcing the Second Amendment.112  The authors identify two 
cases upholding, and one case invalidating, such restrictions.113 Heller did 
not explicitly address public carry regulations.  Nevertheless, the authors 
characterize one of the decisions as “defiant,” in part owing to its application 
of an intermediate standard of scrutiny (which the authors view as closely 
resembling rational basis review in application).114  While one can certainly 
 109.  See Re, supra note 12, at 962 (“Much as an ambiguous statute amounts to a lawmaking 
delegation to executive agencies, Heller effectively delegated interpretive power to the lower 
courts.”) (footnote omitted). 
 110.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6. 
 111.  See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 9, at 196 (concluding based on qualitative assessment 
that some lower courts are misapplying Heller and, in certain contexts, under-enforcing the Second 
Amendment); Cottrol & Mocsary, supra note 37 (arguing that lower courts are “undercutting . . . 
Supreme Court precedent” in a way that is suggestive of “something other than a desire to control 
crime”); O’Shea, supra note 36, at 1425 (characterizing the “tenor” of lower court Second 
Amendment decisions as “deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to claims that the Second 
Amendment limits government action”);
 112.  Cottrol & Mocsary, supra note 37.  
 113.  Id. at 30–31. 
 114.  Id. at 31–32. 
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criticize some public carry decisions as incorrect applications of Heller or 
complain about the degree of judicial scrutiny, evidence from just three 
decisions hardly supports the conclusion that courts have “outright defied 
decades of fundamental-right jurisprudence.”115
Examining the first half-decade of post-Heller decisions in the lower 
federal courts, Michael O’Shea perceives some “genuine threats to the 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”116  Despite Heller and 
McDonald, O’Shea argues, evidence shows that the Second Amendment is 
being treated as an “underenforced constitutional norm”—a right that 
courts, primarily for institutional reasons, have declined to fully enforce.117
O’Shea presents evidence that lower courts are concerned about 
reaching beyond what Heller expressly holds.  Some courts have openly 
expressed concerns about the potential social costs of judicial errors with 
regard to misinterpreting Heller—in particular, the potential for violence.118
However, it is not clear that expressing these concerns demonstrates 
widespread institutional underenforcement.  Indeed, the concerns expressed 
might just as plausibly be characterized as resting on traditional principles of 
judicial restraint or minimalism.119 Heller recognized a right to keep and 
bear arms and identified its “core,” but it did not purport to exhaustively 
define the fundamental right to keep and bear arms.  Indeed, it expressly 
disclaimed any intention to do so.120  In light of the under-defined and under-
theorized right, some courts have proceeded with caution in adjudicating 
claims that extend beyond the apparent core.  As Richard Re has observed, 
although Heller has indeed been “narrowed-from-below,” judged by 
standard methods of “vertical stare decisis,” lower court treatments of the 
decision have been reasonable and defensible.121
Perhaps this is why Professor O’Shea’s “second-class” enforcement 
claim seems to be based less on institutional underenforcement arguments 
than on what he refers to as the “tenor” and “orientation” of the lower courts 
“in prominent cases.”122  Even in this respect, however, the evidence of 
underenforcement is thin. 
 115.   Cottrol & Mocsary, supra note 37, at 30. 
 116.  O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1384. 
 117.  Id. at 1411–12.  See Sager, supra note 20, at 1239–40. 
 118.  O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1413–14. 
 119.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (2001) (describing a method of deciding cases narrowly and/or shallowly).  
 120.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (emphasizing that in its 
“first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire 
field”). 
 121.  Re, supra note 12, at 962. 
 122.  O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1414. 
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Summarizing only “prominent” federal court decisions, and only “at a 
general level,” O’Shea identifies certain contexts, including restrictions on 
open carry outside the home, in which he claims courts have not properly 
enforced the Second Amendment.  However, of the five decisions in this 
context that he discusses, two that initially upheld restrictions on open carry 
were reversed on appeal.  Of the five additional decisions O’Shea analyzes, 
which upheld other restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms, one of 
those was later reversed on appeal.  Even assuming all of these decisions 
were correctly characterized as “prominent” (for instance, one case involved 
a challenge to a registration fee), this means that a total of seven federal court 
decisions upheld firearms regulations of various sorts. 
O’Shea’s study does not consider the holdings or “tenor” of Second 
Amendment claims in cases that he does not deem “prominent.”  It seems 
likely that in some, or perhaps even many, of those cases the restrictions were 
upheld pursuant to one of Heller’s categorical exemptions (for example, 
felon dispossession) or perhaps did not raise a significant Second 
Amendment issue.123  Further, the O’Shea study shows that in the first five 
years after Heller, five lower courts did invalidate firearms regulations.124
This means that in total, the study identified seven “prominent” cases in 
which federal courts upheld firearms restrictions, and five decisions in which 
courts invalidated them.  As discussed further below, tallying judicial 
dispositions cannot tell us whether the Second Amendment is being 
appropriately enforced.  However, if we are keeping score, even in the most 
“prominent” cases the results do not indicate “genuine threats” to the Second 
Amendment. 
This analysis does not suggest that decisions in O’Shea’s study indicate 
a robust or enthusiastic judicial embrace of the Second Amendment.  Some 
lower courts have arguably misinterpreted or misapplied Heller.  Of course, 
that also happens outside the Second Amendment context.  In some cases, 
courts have expressed reservations about interpreting the right to keep and 
bear arms such that it applies in non-sensitive public places or includes a 
right to keep and bear assault-style weapons.  However, these concerns did 
not always result in the refusal to recognize or enforce Second Amendment 
rights.  Moreover, as suggested earlier, courts may have proceeded with 
caution not out of any hostility to or bias against the Second Amendment, 
but rather out of concerns relating to extension of a unique fundamental right 
whose exercise may result in the use of offensive or defensive deadly force.  
Reasonable readers of the “prominent” decisions in O’Shea’s study can 
 123.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1471–86 (discussing various types of claims). 
 124.  O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1419–20. 
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disagree about whether their “tenor” was pragmatic or minimalistic, as 
opposed to “deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile” to the Second 
Amendment.125
Finally, two collaborators read all of the Second Amendment decisions 
from the federal courts of appeals during the first 8 years post-Heller.126
Their general descriptions of appeals court decisions suggest that the right to 
keep and bear arms is being enforced in a manner similar to—in fact, in 
many circuits is being modeled upon—the First Amendment free speech 
right.127  Thus, the study shows that federal appeals courts have generally 
adopted a two-part test to adjudicate Second Amendment claims, with robust 
protection provided at the core of the right and lesser but still significant 
protection outside that domain.128  On its face, at least, this sort of doctrinal 
framework is familiar to fundamental rights adjudication. 
To be sure, the study takes issue with the interpretation of Heller, and 
the Second Amendment more generally, in a few circuits and with respect to 
certain types of regulations—particularly limits on firearms outside the 
home (again, an issue neither Heller nor McDonald explicitly address).129
However, the study does not describe a fundamental right that is routinely 
being subjected to rational basis or other non-fundamental rights standards.  
Although it suggests some difficulty in the lower courts in terms of parsing 
Heller and determining the Second Amendment’s boundaries, it does not 
demonstrate that the Second Amendment is being treated as a “second-class” 
or non-fundamental right. 
The qualitative studies suffer from various deficiencies.  Some are 
based on such a small sample of cases that they provide only impressionistic 
data.  Others review a subset of cases—“prominent” ones, for example—
without taking into account the broader landscape of Second Amendment 
litigation.  Still others have broader coverage in terms of sample size, but 
highlight what seem to be outlier examples of alleged misinterpretation or 
doctrinal deviation.  The studies leave out a lot of litigation, most notably at 
the state level.  Finally, none of the qualitative studies offers any comparative 
benchmark by which to measure enforcement of the Second Amendment. 
 125.  O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1425. 
 126.  Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 9.  
 127.  See id. at 274–75 (discussing choice of level of scrutiny). 
 128.  See id. at 212–14 (describing two-part test). 
 129.  See id. at 265 (discussing Third Circuit’s treatment of Second Amendment rights outside 
the home); id. at 268 (discussing Ninth Circuit’s analysis of right to concealed carry outside the 
home); id. at 288–96 (criticizing Second Circuit’s approach to Second Amendment claims, which 
only applies heightened scrutiny to “substantial burdens” on Second Amendment rights). 
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B.  Quantitative Studies 
 Scholars have begun to produce significant empirical evidence 
concerning Second Amendment claims.  Eric Ruben and Joseph Blocher 
have published an empirical study of the thousand-plus lower court decisions 
(state and federal, trial and appellate) handed down since Heller.130  The 
authors do not purport to resolve whether Second Amendment enforcement 
has been “second-class” in any normative sense.131  However, several of their 
conclusions do tend to refute, or at least raise significant doubts concerning, 
claims that courts have subjected the Second Amendment to disfavored 
treatment. 
“Second-class” arguments frequently begin, and not infrequently end, 
by pointing to the very low success rate of Second Amendment claims.  As 
Ruben and Blocher acknowledge, “the vast majority of Second Amendment 
claims fail.  Of the 1,153 Second Amendment challenges in the database, 
only 108 were not rejected, for an overall success rate of 9 percent.”132  But 
they argue that the low success rate “does not show that the right is being 
underenforced.”133  Instead, the authors conclude that the data “shows that 
the low rate of success probably has more to do with the claims being 
asserted than with judicial hostility to the right.”134
Nearly a quarter of the challenges, they note, were to felon-in-
possession laws and all but one percent of such challenges failed.135  Indeed, 
the authors write, “a clear majority of the challenges—742 of 1,153—arose 
in criminal cases, in which defense counsel might be expected to raise any 
nonsanctionable defense.  The low rate of success in those cases (six percent) 
and the 126 cases involving pro se litigants (two percent) pulls down the 
 130.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6. 
 131.  See id. at 1449 (“To be clear, these arguments are not purely empirical. Saying that a right 
is systematically underenforced involves at least two steps: a conclusion about how stringently it 
should be enforced, and an assessment of how it actually is enforced in practice. Parties in the gun 
debate disagree about both of these things, but our focus in this Article is the latter.”).  
 132.  Id. at 1472. 
 133.  Id. at 1507. 
 134.  Id. But see Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Is the Second Amendment a Second-
Class Right? (NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 18-43),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247773 (draft on file with author); id. at
105–06 n. 16 (“Given the plausible causation theories and limited information, however, we are 
not quite ready to agree that [Ruben & Blocher’s data] ‘shows that the low rates of success [for 
Second Amendment claims] probably has more to do with the claims being asserted than with 
judicial hostility to the right.’”). 
 135.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1507. 
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success rate as a whole.”136  As other commentators have observed, these 
kinds of claims “are, bluntly speaking, outstanding losers.”137
Ruben and Blocher also find that “[t]he success rate of Second 
Amendment claims is highly correlated with who makes them, and whether 
and how they are represented.”138  They report that “civil litigants succeeded 
two and half times more often than criminal defendants,” while civil 
plaintiffs with legal representation “had a success rate of 40 percent in the 
federal appellate courts.”139  The authors attribute these success rates to case 
selection: “civil attorneys are selecting better cases to litigate.”140
Other empirical studies cast doubt on the significance of the success 
rate in Second Amendment cases.  Professors Samaha and Germano, who 
have focused in particular on the influence of judicial ideology in Second 
Amendment, free speech, and other constitutional cases, make three points 
that are salient to this form of “second-class” enforcement claim. 
First, they note that comparisons across constitutional or litigation areas 
raise distinctive conceptual and other challenges.141  Even accepting that 
success rates are a valid benchmark of comparison, Samaha and Germano 
observe, this does not mean that “equalization of success rates is justified.”142
“Standing alone,” they write, “differences do not prove that judges are 
erring.”143  Second, even granting that success rates are a valid point of 
comparison, the Second Amendment’s low success rate does not set it apart 
from other rights and constitutional provisions.144  Third, as Samaha and 
Germano note, “last place doesn’t necessarily mean second class.”145
Ruben and Blocher’s study also sheds some light on other aspects of 
“second-class” enforcement claims.  Unsurprisingly, their data suggest that 
 136.  Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1507.  
 137.  See Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 860. 
 138.  Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1509. 
 139.  Id.
 140.  Id.
 141.  See Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 104–05 (noting complications in comparing 
success rates across fields of litigation). 
 142.  Id. at 112. 
 143.  Id.  This is at least a partial response to the argument that under “heightened” levels of 
judicial scrutiny in other areas, constitutional rights claims are highly successful.  See George 
Mocsary, A Close Reading of an Excellent Distant Reading of Heller in the Courts, 68 DUKE L.J. 
41, 52–53 (2018) (suggesting that success rates in Second Amendment cases ought to be compared 
to other claims subject to heightened scrutiny). 
 144.  See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 
WILL. & MARY L. REV. 35, 58 (2016) (reporting low success rates for regulatory takings claims in 
state courts); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 428–29 (2012) (reporting low 
success rates for certain Fourth Amendment claims). 
 145.  See Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 112. 
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lower courts have paid close attention to Heller’s recognition of Second 
Amendment limitations and exemptions.  Indeed, they note, Heller’s
discussion of “presumptively lawful” regulations was relied upon in 60 
percent of the challenges in the study.146  Other empirical work confirms that 
the lower courts are indeed paying very close attention to what Heller said.147
Thus, a mere tally of Second Amendment wins and losses does not 
establish “second-class” enforcement.  As Ruben and Blocher show, the 
success rate does not take into consideration the nature of the claims pursued, 
the identity of the challengers, the courts and court systems in which their 
claims are adjudicated, and many other important variables. 
Evidence from the Ruben and Blocher study also supports Part II’s 
argument that the Second Amendment, as enforced, has been conceptualized 
as a “fundamental” constitutional right.  For example, their review of the 
data “suggests that, within successful challenges, where the court finds that 
a law infringes on the “core” or “central component” of the right, the burden 
on the government increases.”148
Further, the Ruben and Blocher study shows that just as they have in 
the case of other fundamental rights, courts have applied varying levels or 
degrees of scrutiny to regulations of Second Amendment rights—and 
sometimes, again as in other constitutional areas, have failed to identify any 
specific standard of scrutiny.149  Further, Ruben and Blocher conclude that 
burdens on the “core” of the Second Amendment right have consistently 
been subject to strict scrutiny, while other burdens have received either 
intermediate scrutiny or have been invalidated without specification of a 
specific standard.150  All of this is wholly consistent with judicial 
enforcement of fundamental rights. 
As additional evidence of fundamental conception and enforcement, 
Ruben and Blocher’s data show that in some courts a tiered scrutiny regime 
 146.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1488. 
 147.  See Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 872 (finding positive and statistically 
significant Supreme Court case score in gun rights cases). 
 148.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1499. 
 149.  Id. at 1499–1500. 
 150.  As Ruben and Blocher observe:  
In 94 percent of the successful challenges where the court found that the burden 
was not on the core of the right, the court applied intermediate, as opposed to strict, 
scrutiny.  Meanwhile, courts applied intermediate scrutiny only 14 percent of the 
time when a burden did fall on the core of the right. Otherwise, the court applied 
strict scrutiny (29 percent) or, more commonly, granted relief without making clear 
what standard the court was applying (57 percent).  
Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6 at 1499–1500. 
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has begun to emerge.151  Their study shows that intermediate scrutiny “has 
been the most prevalent form of scrutiny,” with federal appellate courts 
applying that standard 79 percent of the time, federal district courts doing so 
74 percent of the time, and state appellate courts applying intermediate 
scrutiny 68 percent of the time.152  Moreover, the authors concluded that 
“[c]ontrary to the common assertion, application of intermediate scrutiny has 
not invariably been fatal to Second Amendment claims.”153  At the same 
time, they concluded that although strict scrutiny resulted in a higher rate of 
invalidation of firearms regulations, “strict scrutiny was far from fatal to 
challenged weapons laws.”154  As discussed further in Part IV, the seeming 
breakdown of tiered scrutiny is not unusual.155  Indeed, it has become 
increasingly common across a range of fundamental rights. 
Finally, Ruben and Blocher’s data examine cross-circuit disparities in 
terms of the success of Second Amendment claims.  The authors found a 
federal circuit disparity, but they attributed it largely to the fact that only a 
few states, located in certain circuits, had enacted the kind of strict gun 
control laws that were likely to be invalidated.156  Thus, Ruben and Blocher 
conclude: “The relatively high proportion of successes in the Second, Fourth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits is consistent with the view that these courts 
are not in open rebellion against the Second Amendment.”157  Indeed, 
although one cannot really quantify class-based “second-class” claims, these 
results certainly suggest that “elite” circuits are not overtly unfriendly to 
Second Amendment claims. 
Critics of the Ruben and Blocher study insist that the data do not support 
the claim that the Second Amendment is being properly enforced.158
However, they do not provide a baseline from which to determine whether 
the right to keep and bear arms is actually being “underenforced.”  
Consequently, the critiques suffer from the same general infirmity as other 
“second class” enforcement claims.  For example, although Heller does not 
resolve the issue, some critics of the Ruben and Blocher study assume a 
 151.  Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1494. 
 152.  Id. at 1496. 
 153.  Id.
 154.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1496. 
 155.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 156.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1497 (“Within federal courts of appeals, about 96 
percent of successes came out of the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits—far higher 
than the 54 percent (119 of 219) of Second Amendment cases heard by those circuits.”). 
 157.  Id.
 158.  See David B. Kopel, Data Indicate Second Amendment Underenforcement, 68 DUKE L.J. 
79 (2018); Mocsary, supra note 143.  The critics also make more granular empirical claims about 
the manner in which the authors collected and coded decisions in Second Amendment cases.   
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“correct” answer to the scope of public carry rights and then fault lower 
courts for not enforcing their preferred interpretation.159  Others do not 
contest the data itself, but suggest that judges are hiding or masking their 
hostility to Second Amendment rights and defying Heller.160  But of course, 
such claims are not falsifiable.  In any event, lower courts are not always shy 
about indicating explicit disagreements with Supreme Court precedents.161
Thus, if there is open judicial hostility to Heller, we might expect to see it 
more transparently expressed. 
Like the available qualitative data, quantitative data do not paint a 
picture of a disrespected right or courts engaged in massive resistance to 
Heller or the Second Amendment.  The individual right to keep and bear 
arms, as enforced in lower courts, exhibits traits that are common to the 
broader class of fundamental rights.  The Second Amendment that has 
emerged is non-absolute and subject to specific and perhaps additional 
coverage exceptions.  Courts have generally applied either strict or 
intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment burdens.  Ruben and Blocher’s 
data suggest that the right to keep and bear arms is nuanced and variable.162
The Second Amendment can be a strong trump, in the sense that it prevents 
government from regulating the right to keep and bear arms in certain 
circumstances.  This occurs, as one would expect, when the core of the 
Second Amendment right is implicated.  And when that occurs, the 
government’s burden of justification generally increases. 
These are all familiar attributes of fundamental constitutional rights.  
The data depict a Second Amendment that is becoming normalized, 
“legalistic,” and methodologically nuanced.163  The right to keep and bear 
arms is being assimilated, sometimes more slowly than its proponents would 
like, into the family of fundamental constitutional rights. 
C.  Judicial Ideology 
Some studies have also attempted to isolate and assess the extent to 
which judicial ideology has affected Second Amendment enforcement.  
Although this factor cannot be ruled out, the existing data do not demonstrate 
 159.  E.g., Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 9, at 9–10 (critiquing circuit court decisions on this 
ground).
 160.  See Mocsary, supra note 143, at 42–43. 
 161.  See Re, supra note 12, at 963–64 (citing examples of lower court criticisms of Supreme 
Court decisions concerning the right of habeas corpus). 
 162.  See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1507 (“The doctrinal landscape is more diverse, 
nuanced, and interesting than many suppose.”). 
 163.  Id.
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that ideology or preference exert a strong influence on outcomes in Second 
Amendment cases. 
Professor O’Shea’s study, which was discussed earlier, examined the 
political party of the judges who wrote Second Amendment opinions during 
the five-year study period.164  O’Shea identified what he described as “a 
profound partisan divide,” with Democrat-appointed judges almost 
uniformly upholding firearms regulations and Republican-appointed judges 
voting to invalidate them.165  Like other commentators, Professor O’Shea 
fails to consider that Heller and other pro-firearms decisions might also be 
characterized as the result of judicial partisanship.  In the world of “second-
class” claims, partisanship seems to explain only the losses, and not the wins,
of firearms proponents. 
In any event, Professor O’Shea highlighted some significant caveats.  
For example, he acknowledged that “a fair number” of the cases involved 
claims by convicted felons, which again Heller essentially foreclosed.  This 
significantly reduced the probative value of these decisions.166  O’Shea also 
acknowledged that Republican-appointed judges “have authored many 
important opinions rejecting plausible Second Amendment claims or 
expressing skepticism about broadened Second Amendment rights.”167
Professor O’Shea was not attempting to demonstrate a statistically 
significant ideological effect.  More modestly, he concluded based on his 
study that “judges selected by Republican presidents occasionally held that 
government action violates the Second Amendment while judges selected by 
Democratic presidents essentially never did so.”168  However, as Professor 
O’Shea seems to acknowledge, that is not a valid empirical demonstration of 
partisan or ideological bias. 
Indeed, the real problem, as empiricists have observed, lies in isolating 
the various factors––in addition to judicial ideology––which might lead to 
such results.  Thus far, more rigorous quantitative studies have failed to 
reveal any “profound partisan divide.”  Although the data show that Second 
Amendment claims lag behind other types of constitutional claims in terms 
of attracting votes from Democrat-appointed judges, they do not isolate 
ideology or preference in a strong causal sense.169
 164.  Ruben & Blocher, supra note 6, at 1443–1447. 
 165.  Id. at 1444. 
 166.  Id. at 1501.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 167.  O’Shea, supra note 37, at 1423. 
 168.  Id.
 169.  See Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 111–12 (noting that while there is an 
ideological effect, its causes are not clear). 
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In a study that compares various constitutional claims, including 
abortion, affirmative action, and gun rights, Professors Samaha and 
Germano observe that judicial ideology appears to play a relatively minor 
role in terms of explaining Second Amendment case outcomes.170
Specifically, they conclude that “the variable identifying judges as 
Democratic or Republican appointees is not a statistically significant 
predictor in gun rights cases.”171
Samaha and Germano reach a similar conclusion in a follow-up study 
focusing on the same constitutional areas, but this time limiting their study 
of the Second Amendment to civil claims.172  The authors conclude that while 
judicial ideology may contribute to the disparities in success rates across 
constitutional claims, they “cannot make much progress on why gun rights 
claims might fare worse than certain other claims.”173  They observe that 
“plausible explanations are available that have nothing to do with judges 
disliking gun rights, and existing data cannot rule out those alternatives.”174
They conclude that in comparative claims studies like their own, “finding 
 170.  See Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 861 (concluding that “the summary statistics 
indicate that commercial speech claims are like gun rights claims in that ideology might play a 
small role, while ideology might play a large role in abortion rights, establishment clause, and anti-
affirmative action claims”).  (The authors caution that, in part owing to the prevalence of criminal 
claims in the database, “judicial support for gun rights claims is so terribly low that this field of 
litigation might not be amenable to grouping with other claims.”).  
 171.  Id. at 865. 
 172.  Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 106–07. (As the authors note, the high number 
of criminal cases in the Second Amendment database may skew success rates, owing to the actions 
of appointed counsel who may “adopt implausible legal positions when facing serious penalties.”)  
 173.  Id. at 103. 
 174.  Id.  With regard to the low success rate of Second Amendment claims, Professors Samaha 
and Germano surmise as follows:  
Among the possibilities worth considering are stakes and resources.  Perhaps, for 
example, the litigation arm of the gun rights movement is generally better financed 
than other constitutional litigation shops, and can afford to litigate claims that are 
unlikely to prevail.  And perhaps a high fraction of litigation losses are tolerable for 
this class of litigants because persistent litigation maintains high expected costs for 
regulators who otherwise would like to innovate with new gun policies—and 
perhaps litigation losses can be used to promote the cause to gun owners, who may 
be reminded that judges are not willing to establish their preferred gun policies and 
who may then increase their material support for the broader cause.  Or perhaps gun 
rights claimants and lawyers are relatively more committed to their cause, are less 
influenced by a global litigation plan of some organizing body, and are not dissuaded 
by judicial rejection.  But again, the factors that might make gun rights litigation 
special will have to be explored in future work. 
Samaha & Germano, supra note 23, at 860–61, n.176. 
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distinctive voting patterns among Democratic and Republican appointees is 
closer to the beginning of the investigation than the end.”175
Nor has evidence of “elite” or professional bias materialized.  As noted 
earlier, both pre- and post-Heller, some commentators have asserted that 
such bias causes courts to view and treat Second Amendment claims and 
claimants as “second-class.”176  However, these claims have not been backed 
by actual evidence.  Moreover, some of the complaints have been directed 
solely at federal appellate judges.  That leaves the puzzle of why Second 
Amendment claims frequently fail in state courts as well, where presumably 
the same professional and elite biases do not exist or are at least less 
pronounced.  Such impressionistic “second-class” claims provide little in the 
way of actual evidence that the Second Amendment has been forsaken or 
disrespected by judges owing to their attitudinal biases. 
In sum, quantitative studies have not produced any convincing evidence 
that the Second Amendment is being under-enforced by lower courts, much 
less that it is the object of resistance or rebellion.  The data cannot rule out 
that some courts may be hostile to or biased against Second Amendment 
claims.  However, the burden properly lies with those who would point to 
mere impressions, attitudinal factors, or the general “tenor” of decisions to 
demonstrate that the Second Amendment has been under-enforced. 
IV.  The Second Amendment’s Comparative Status 
One of the central premises of “second-class” arguments is that the 
Second Amendment has not been treated with the respect and regard 
accorded other fundamental constitutional rights.  This is evident, critics 
complain, in terms of the standards applied to Second Amendment claims, 
the relative degree of enforcement of the right to keep and bear arms, and the 
overall treatment of Second Amendment claims in lower courts and the 
Supreme Court.  As noted earlier, comparative assessments across a range of 
constitutional rights raise special difficulties.  However, in the broad terms 
“second-class” critics typically adopt, it is possible to subject comparative 
claims to some meaningful scrutiny.  Four general conclusions follow: (1) 
the notion that all rights are created equal is false; (2) insofar as we have a 
hierarchy of fundamental rights, the Second Amendment sits closer to its top 
than to its cellar; (3) substantive comparisons to other rights in the same 
class, including the freedom of speech, do not establish the Second 
Amendment’s “second-class” status; and (4) judged relative to other 
 175.  Samaha & Germano, supra note 134, at 112. 
 176.  See O’Shea, supra note 37.  
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fundamental constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has not “orphaned” or 
abandoned the Second Amendment. 
A.  The Fallacy of Equality and the Hierarchy of Fundamental 
Rights
“Second-class” claims are based, in part, on the notion that there is, or 
at least ought to be, no hierarchy of rights under our Constitution.  The 
Second Amendment, the argument goes, is entitled to the same status, 
standards, and enforcement as other recognized constitutional rights.  And 
since all constitutional rights are created equal, it is wrong to subject any of 
them to differential treatment.  Simply put, to borrow a phrase from the first 
Justice Harlan, with regard to constitutional rights “there is no caste here.”177
The trouble with this form of the “second-class” argument is that it is 
“demonstrably false.”178  Not all constitutional rights are created equal––a 
fact demonstrated, ironically, by the very concept of “fundamental” rights. 
Not even all of rights in the sub-class of “fundamental” rights enjoy 
equal status.  That is because fundamental constitutional rights have long 
been explicitly and implicitly ranked.  For instance, as noted earlier, within 
the class of fundamental rights, incorporated rights are “fundamental” in a 
special sense: By virtue of their unique status, these rights enjoy broader 
scope and enforcement than the sub-class of “second-class” un-incorporated
rights.  Since the 1930s, economic rights have been disfavored vis-à-vis non-
economic rights.179  Moreover, some consider the class of enumerated
fundamental rights––those explicitly set forth in the text, as in the Bill of 
Rights––to be more legitimate than the class of “un-enumerated”
fundamental rights that includes the right to abortion and other “privacy” 
rights.180
These distinctions are all familiar to constitutional jurisprudence and 
theory.  With respect to each distinction, the Second Amendment is clearly 
on the “preferred” side of the line.  It is an incorporated, non-economic, and 
textually explicit constitutional right.  Insofar as there are “classes” of 
constitutional rights, the Second Amendment possesses all of the basic 
hallmarks of a “first-class” right. 
Public discourse about fundamental rights demonstrates the existence 
of a hierarchy and, again, confirms the Second Amendment’s high rank 
 177.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 178.  Miller, supra note 19. 
 179.  See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (describing framework for 
application of heightened judicial scrutiny). 
 180.  See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
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within that hierarchy.  As Professor Miller notes, the decisions in Roe v. 
Wade181 and Colgrove v. Battin182 were both handed down in 1973.  
Although both are significant decisions in terms of fundamental rights, most 
Americans could not pick Colgrove out of a precedential lineup.  (The 
decision held that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a twelve-member 
jury in civil cases.).  Professor Miller observes: “I have yet to see cable news 
pundits lament the demise of the twelve-member jury, or read of a Twitter 
war raging over the meaning of ‘in suits at common law . . . the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved’ or learn of grass-roots mobilization to restore the 
original understanding of the Seventh Amendment.”183
In terms of public recognition and political salience, Heller and the 
Second Amendment are much closer to Roe and the abortion right than to 
Colgrove and the jury trial right.  As mentioned earlier, Heller and the 
Second Amendment have fundamentally altered public discourse about gun 
control.  Public and legislative support for gun rights is very high, in both 
real and relative terms.  If there were a Rodney Dangerfield Award, the Third 
Amendment, which has been ignored by the Supreme Court and is one of the 
few un-incorporated rights in the Bill of Rights, would be a solid contender.  
However, the Second Amendment, which has the sustained attention of 
courts, officials, and the public, would not even be in the running. 
A relatively short list of constitutional rights tends to dominate the field.  
Professor Miller sums things up: “Free speech, the right to keep and bear 
arms, equal protection, due process, privacy––these are the sexy rights.  
Everything else is B-list.”184  One might round out this list with a few other 
rights, including the right to vote and the free exercise of religion, both of 
which can also make a plausible claim to “A-list” status.  However, Professor 
Miller is surely correct about two things: the fundamental rights “A-list” is 
short, and the Second Amendment is definitely on it. 
B.  Within-Class Status 
Some “second-class” claimants might accept the foregoing general 
premises, yet still argue that the Second Amendment has been disfavored or 
disrespected relative to other fundamental rights in its class.  One prominent 
version of this argument is that relative to other rights in the class, courts 
have framed the Second Amendment differently or subjected it to less 
favorable standards. 
 181.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 182.  413 U.S. 149 (1973). 
 183.  Miller, supra note 19.   
184.  Id.
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 83 Side A      02/26/2019   14:13:21
41063-hco_46-3 Sheet No. 83 Side A      02/26/2019   14:13:21
ZICK_MACROED_READY FOR PRINTERS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2019 5:21 PM
Spring 2019]           THE SECOND AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 659 
Part III offered a partial answer to this concern, in terms of judicial 
enforcement of the Second Amendment.  The data suggest that Second 
Amendment claims are being assimilated into the family of fundamental 
constitutional rights.  Thus, familiar standards and frameworks, including the 
concept of “tiered” scrutiny, have now developed in the Second Amendment 
area as they have in other fundamental rights contexts. 
From this perspective, the real problem that gun control opponents have 
encountered is not that their claims are being treated differently by courts, 
but rather that they are being normalized within a fundamental rights 
doctrine that has long exhibited ambiguities and inconsistencies.  For 
example, one common “second-class” complaint has been that courts are not 
consistently applying “heightened scrutiny” to gun control measures.  
However, as scholars have observed, the tiered scrutiny regime has not held 
up across a range of fundamental constitutional rights.185  As Jamal Greene 
has noted, “[e]ach particular fundamental right . . . bears its own bespoke 
doctrinal formula.”186  This reality significantly complicates arguments that 
a particular fundamental right is being disfavored relative to other members 
of the class.  As Professor Miller has observed, “[n]o right can be an outlier 
if every right is in a class by itself.”187
Insofar as fundamental constitutional rights are concerned, there is no 
mandatory script or set of magic words we can look for in assessing their 
relative strength or status.  As discussed in Part II, strict scrutiny has never
been a reliable indicator of fundamentality.  Thus, its absence in most Second 
Amendment cases does not demonstrate differential or unequal treatment. 
Indeed, standards and frameworks applied to other fundamental rights 
generally undermine arguments about the Second Amendment’s disfavored 
treatment.  Thus, even “substantial” burdens on the free exercise of religion 
are permissible, so long as they result from application of laws or regulations 
that are “neutral and generally applicable.”188  Strict scrutiny is reserved for 
laws that purposefully target or discriminate against religion.189  Since 1992, 
abortion rights have been governed by an “undue burden” standard that 
grants government broad power to regulate most aspects of abortion and 
prohibits only laws that have the purpose or effect of denying women’s 
 185.  See Miller, supra note 19 (suggesting that “the tiers of scrutiny are crumbling for every 
right”).
 186.  Jamal Greene, The Age of Scalia, 130 HARV. L. REV. 144 (2016).  
 187.  Miller, supra note 19. 
 188.  Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 189.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (applying 
heightened scrutiny to local ordinances that singled out religious rituals). 
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access to abortion services.190  Some recent Due Process Clause “privacy” 
cases do not explicitly adopt any particular standard of scrutiny.191  When 
judged according to the standard of scrutiny applied, lower courts have 
treated Second Amendment claims at least as favorably––and in some cases 
arguably more favorably––than these other fundamental rights claims. 
As these examples also show, fundamental rights are not always the 
strong trumps that gun rights proponents apparently believe them to be.  
Thus, the “fundamental” right to marry is subject to a variety of state and 
federal regulations that have not raised any serious constitutional questions.  
Despite the fact that the right to vote is fundamental, the Supreme Court has 
upheld even lifetime bans on felon voting rights.192  This shows that classes 
of individuals sometimes enjoy variable fundamental rights.  For example, 
with respect to incarcerated persons, the right to vote can be denied, the right 
to marry cannot, and freedom of speech can be abridged when it is deemed 
reasonably necessary to further legitimate penological interests.193
Within the sub-class of “fundamental” constitutional rights, the Court 
has developed a messy milieu of doctrines, standards, and approaches.  In 
this context, claims of differential treatment are difficult if not impossible to 
maintain.  Indeed, insofar as Second Amendment decisions are largely using 
some form of tiered scrutiny approach, with at least some regulations subject 
to fatal forms of scrutiny, the right to keep and bear arms is arguably 
receiving more protection than, say, free exercise of religion or the right to 
abortion.  In sum, if standards of review are suggestive of status, the Second 
Amendment is not among the most disfavored rights in the fundamental 
rights class. 
C.  Freedom of Speech – Then and Now 
As discussed earlier, when the Court recognized the individual right to 
keep and bear arms in Heller, it repeatedly invoked the Free Speech Clause 
as a model or analogy.  Freedom of speech is a natural right for “new” rights 
to aspire to.  No other right displays the same degree of magnetism and 
influence––in public discourse, scholarly writing, or judicial decisions––as 
 190.  Compare Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (upholding 
various state regulations on abortion) with Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 
(2016) (invalidating a state effort to severely restrict access to abortion services). 
 191.  See e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that Texas sodomy law did 
not survive even rationality review); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (failing to 
specify standard of review under Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause).  
 192.  See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).  
 193.  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94–95 (1987). 
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the Free Speech Clause.194  Some have warned against analogizing the 
Second Amendment to the First Amendment for purposes of constructing 
constitutional doctrines.195  However, since “second-class” arguments often 
focus on the preferred status of free speech, the comparison is worth 
examining.  In some important respects, the analogy demonstrates the 
opposite of what “second-class” claimants apparently intend.  The right to 
keep and bear arms and the free speech right share more in common than 
“second-class” critics typically acknowledge or seem to realize. 
1.  The Free Speech Clause’s First Decade 
Between ratification and recognition, both Second Amendment and 
First Amendment rights experienced extended periods of jurisprudential 
dormancy.  In decisions handed down during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the Supreme Court indicated that the right to keep and bear arms 
was narrow and perhaps limited to militia service.196  From its ratification in 
1791 through the Heller decision in 2008, the Court did not recognize a 
fundamental constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  Similarly, the Court 
did not engage with the Free Speech Clause until 1919, when it handed down 
a series of famously speech-restrictive decisions.197  Prior to that, the Court 
had suggested that freedom of speech and press might prohibit only prior 
restraints on expression.198  In their pre-recognition eras, the Court 
interpreted the right to keep and bear arms and freedom of speech quite 
narrowly. 
With regard to the Second Amendment, Heller changed the landscape 
dramatically when it recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms.  
McDonald, which was handed down shortly thereafter, significantly 
expanded the scope of Second Amendment enforcement by placing the right 
in the category of “fundamental” rights applicable to the states.  These two 
 194.  See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1787–1800 (2004) (discussing 
cultural and other aspects of the “magnetism” of the free speech right).  
 195.  See e.g., TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 203–41 (2018); Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking 
Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51 
(2012).
 196.  See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 254–65 (1886) (upholding ban on armed 
paramilitary parades); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (upholding federal gun control 
law). 
 197.  See e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211, 216 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 198.  Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
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decisions represent an obvious starting point for assessing the right to keep 
and bear arms as a “fundamental” right. 
In terms of the Free Speech Clause, the point of judicial recognition 
arguably occurred not in 1919, when the Court first engaged with the free 
speech right, but rather when the Court first signaled that freedom of speech 
was “fundamental” in the sense that it applied to the states.  This occurred in 
1925, in Gitlow v. New York.199 To be sure, in terms of the development of 
fundamental rights jurisprudence, Gitlow was decided very early.  The Court 
did not begin to develop a coherent approach or framework with respect to 
“fundamental” rights until more than a decade later.200  Some might argue 
that to truly compare apples to apples, the Second Amendment must be 
compared to the contemporary Free Speech Clause.  That comparison is 
discussed below.  However, we can still learn something––perhaps a lot––
from a comparison of the two rights in their respective “first decades.”  From 
the data discussed earlier, we have a sense of how the Second Amendment 
has been enforced during its first decade.  How did the Supreme Court and 
lower courts approach freedom of speech in the first decade after it was 
recognized as a “fundamental” constitutional right? 
We can begin assessing the free speech analogy by examining the 
principal Supreme Court decisions.  Heller and Gitlow are very different 
decisions, but they also share important things in common.  As in Heller, the 
Court’s recognition of the free speech right in Gitlow came with some 
caveats.  In the course of upholding a state law that criminalized 
communications advocating the overthrow of government by violent means, 
the Court observed: 
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of 
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does 
not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without 
responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and 
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of 
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this 
freedom.201
 199.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and 
do assume that freedom of speech and of the press––which are protected by the First Amendment 
from abridgment by Congress––are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
 200.  See U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 201.  Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. 
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As discussed earlier, Heller makes the same point about the Second 
Amendment––i.e., that the right, although fundamental, is not absolute.
Like Heller, Gitlow highlighted some historical and other exceptions to 
free speech coverage.  Thus, the Court observed that “a State may punish 
utterances endangering the foundations of organized government and 
threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.”202  Further, it emphasized that 
freedom of speech “does not protect disturbances to the public peace or the 
attempt to subvert the government.  It does not protect publications or 
teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to impede or 
hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties.”203  So, the free 
speech right, like the right to keep and bear arms, was thought to be subject 
to longstanding exceptions.
There were also some important differences in how the Court 
characterized the rights in Heller and Gitlow. Heller embraced a more robust 
conception of Second Amendment rights than the Gitlow Court adopted 
concerning freedom of speech.  In Gitlow, the Court emphasized that while 
freedom of speech is “an inestimable privilege in a free government,” 
without limitations, “it might become the scourge of the republic.”204  (It is 
impossible to imagine similar words being used in Heller to describe the 
Second Amendment).  Thus, the Court concluded, the idea that “a State in 
the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by 
utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, 
incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question.”205
Like Heller, Gitlow also addressed the nature and scope of judicial 
review.  Recall that Heller disclaimed “interest balancing” and rational basis 
review.  By contrast, Gitlow observed that the state’s determination that 
certain communications advocating the overthrow of the government ought 
to be suppressed was entitled to “great weight,” and indeed that “[e]very 
presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute.”206  The 
Court wrote: “We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or 
unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably 
infringing the freedom of speech or press; and we must and do sustain its 
constitutionality.”207  It reasoned that “[s]uch utterances, by their very nature, 
involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State.  They 
 202.  Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
 203.  Id. at 667–68. 
 204.  Id. at 667. 
 205.  Id.
 206.  Id. at 668. 
 207.  Id. at 670. 
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threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution.”208  At the outset, 
then, Gitlow embraced a form of rationality review for the nominally 
“fundamental” free speech right.  Now, this was obviously long before the 
Court adopted a “tiered” approach to judicial review of burdens on 
constitutional rights.209  However, at the outset, fundamentality did not entail 
a rigorous form of judicial scrutiny, and indeed allowed government to 
restrict speech in furtherance of public safety, order, and other communal 
interests.
Far from envisioning a strong trump against governmental speech 
regulation, Gitlow held that syndicalism laws could be “applied to every 
utterance—not too trivial to be beneath the notice of the law—which is of 
such a character and used with such intent and purpose as to bring it within 
the prohibition of the statute.”210  Unlike Heller and McDonald, which 
recognized self-defense as the core justification for the Second Amendment 
right, Gitlow did not even articulate a value that would presumptively 
outweigh the state’s interests.  Thus, as long as the government had a non-
arbitrary basis for concluding that speech posed some danger to public 
safety, the Court concluded that governments could criminalize it––even 
absent any real showing of “clear and present danger.”211
Gitlow’s framing and conception of the free speech right made it more 
likely that the Supreme Court and lower courts would reject most free speech 
claims.  That is precisely what occurred.  I examined all of the reported 
federal and state cases (trial and appellate) invoking the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause between 1925 and 1935––in effect, the first decade of 
the provision’s post-incorporation enforcement.212  Discarding decisions that 
did not significantly implicate or discuss the merits of First Amendment 
claims yielded approximately two dozen published opinions.213  The sample 
size is obviously small––too small to perform any meaningful empirical 
analysis.  In comparison, there have been more than one thousand post-
Heller Second Amendment decisions.214
 208.  Id. at 669. 
 209.  Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 210.  Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670. 
 211.  Id. at 671. 
 212.  I conducted the following Westlaw search: adv: “first amendment” & (speech OR 
“freedom #of speech” OR “speech clause” or “first amendment” OR “gitlow v. new york”) & DA 
(aft 06-08-1925 & bef 06-08-1935). 
 213.  The search terms captured a large number of Twenty-first Amendment cases, as well as 
some cases involving the free exercise of religion. 
 214.  Reuben & Blocher, supra note 6.  There are several possible explanations for the 
difference.  Most prominently, in the 1920s and 1930s, there were no interest groups, much less 
entire industries devoted to constitutional litigation.  Further, Gitlow clearly emphasized the limited 
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Although the sample size is small, it is still revealing. Consider the 
Supreme Court’s own review of First Amendment claims in the initial 
decade.  During the first post-incorporation decade, the Supreme Court 
handed down just three free speech decisions215––not quite an “orphaning” 
of the right, as Justice Thomas might say, but certainly not far from it.216
One of these cases was Whitney v. California, decided in 1927.217
Whitney involved a challenge to California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act, 
which criminalized willfully organizing and becoming a member of a group 
assembled to advocate, teach, or aid and abet unlawful acts of force or 
terrorism as a means of effecting political change.218  The Court upheld Anita 
Whitney’s conviction, even though she denied joining the Communist Labor 
Party with intent to aid or abet acts of syndicalism by the group.219
The Court’s analysis consisted of a total of three paragraphs.  The first 
emphasized that the free speech right “does not confer an absolute right to 
speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose” and specifically 
does not cover “utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to 
crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized 
government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means.”220  The second 
paragraph declared that the state’s determination that communications and 
assemblies furthering syndicalism “must be given great weight,” that 
“[e]very presumption must be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute,” 
and that the law may not be declared unconstitutional “unless it is an 
arbitrary or unreasonable attempt to exercise the authority vested in the State 
in the public interest.”221  The third and final paragraph applied these 
standards to uphold the application of the syndicalism law to Whitney’s 
scope of free speech and press rights.  This too likely depressed litigation of First Amendment 
claims.  By contrast, Professors Reuben ad Blocher found an above-average appeal rate in Second 
Amendment cases.  Id. at 1474.  They surmised that the trend is related, in part, to the overall lack 
of success in Second Amendment litigation.  Thus, litigants may have brought more Second 
Amendment claims “due to uncertainty in the doctrine (whether real or perceived), strongly 
motivated or overconfident litigants, or some other reason hard to pin down with our data.”  Id.  In 
the context of what we might call the modern culture of constitutional litigation, which includes 
dedicated advocacy and interest groups willing to fund Second Amendment cases, federal and state 
reporters have predictably swelled with decisions. 
 215.  The Court also decided a free press case.  See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 
(1931) (invalidating state law on the ground that it constituted a prior restraint on the press).  
 216.  See infra Part IV.D. (discussing whether the Second Amendment has been “orphaned” 
by the Court). 
 217.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 218.  Id. at 359–60. 
 219.  Although the record below indicated that Whitney had not even raised any First 
Amendment claim, the Court decided to entertain it on appeal.  Id. at 360-61. 
 220.  Id. at 371. 
 221.  Id.
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expressive activities.222  Even Justice Brandeis, who wrote a stirring and 
now-famous concurrence extolling the values of freedom of speech, 
ultimately concluded that Whitney had effectively waived her First 
Amendment claims.223
The Court decided one other syndicalism case during the post-
incorporation decade.  In Fiske v. Kansas, the Court distinguished Gitlow
and Whitney on the ground that the record before it did not contain sufficient 
evidence that the Industrial Workers of the World had advocated or taught 
the necessity of criminal syndicalism.224 Fiske was a brief, unanimous, and 
straightforward application of the Court’s earlier syndicalism precedents. 
The only other free speech case decided during the first post-
incorporation decade was Stromberg v. California.225  The case involved a 
19-year-old summer camp supervisor who allegedly directed camp attendees 
to display a red flag––a reproduction of the flag of Soviet Russia—as part 
of a daily camp ceremony.226  The camp supervisor was convicted by a jury 
of violating a state law banning such displays when done for the purpose of 
opposing organized government, inviting anarchistic action, or aiding 
propaganda of a seditious character.227  The Court emphasized that freedom 
of speech is not an “absolute” right, and that it is subject to various coverage 
exceptions.228  It concluded that the state law could generally be applied 
against the camp supervisor’s activities, but owing to vagueness concerns 
could not be applied to acts of displaying the flag “as a sign, symbol or 
emblem of opposition to organized government.”229
Unlike Heller, Gitlow and Whitney delegated very little interpretive 
authority to the lower courts.  Based on those precedents, several lower 
courts upheld state syndicalism and sedition laws.230  One court––the Ohio 
Supreme Court––was not yet convinced that the Free Speech Clause actually 
applied against the states, although it briefly analyzed and rejected the free 
speech claim anyway.231
 222.  Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372. 
 223.  Id. at 379–80 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 224.  Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927). 
 225.  Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 226.  Id. at 362. 
 227.  Id. at 361. 
 228.  Id. at 368–69. 
 229.  Id. at 369–70. 
 230.  See State v. Kassay, 126 184 N.E. 521 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1932); State v. Boloff, 7 P.2d 775 
(Ore. Sup. Ct. 1932); Carr v. State, 166 S.E. 827 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1932); Comm. v. Goodman, 16 Pa. 
D. & C. 253 (1931); Comm. v. Lazar, 103 157 A. 701 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931). 
 231.  See Kassay, 126 N.E. at 525 (stating that Bill of Rights was “not applicable to the states”).  
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As in the Second Amendment context, lower court decisions took a 
consistent approach to early free speech claims.  Typically, they began by 
observing that the free speech right was not absolute.232  The decisions then 
expressed deference to legislative judgments with regard to the need to 
criminalize communications constituting syndicalism and sedition.233  Some 
tried their hand at applying the Court’s “clear and imminent danger” 
standard, which had been adopted in the World War I era cases, but did not 
engage in anything we might consider heightened scrutiny.234  In all of these 
cases, the First Amendment claim was rejected. 
Free speech claimants were nearly as unsuccessful in other contexts.  
For example, a federal district court upheld the exclusion from the mails of 
the Revolutionary Age, a Communist publication, on the ground that its 
content was “indecent.”235  Under the federal postal laws, material that 
incited arson, murder, or assassination could be deemed non-mailable on the 
ground that it was “indecent.”236  The court rejected the publisher’s First 
Amendment claim, reasoning that “use of the mails is a privilege” rather than 
a right, and that the postal authorities could exclude publications that even 
implicitly advocated violence.237
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Radio Commission 
acted reasonably when it rejected a broadcaster’s application for renewal of 
a radio license.238  The court interpreted the First Amendment as prohibiting 
prior restraints on publication, while “leaving to correction by subsequent 
punishment those utterances or publications contrary to the public 
welfare.”239  With regard to the First Amendment, the court stated that the 
only question was whether the federal statute was a “reasonable exercise of 
 232.  See Kassay, 126 N.E. at 525 (“The right of free speech is fundamental, but it is not 
absolute.”); Boloff, 7 P.2d at 780 (“It is clear that freedom of speech is not an absolute right without 
limitation.”); Carr, 166 S.E. at 829 (quoting Gitlow concerning non-absolute nature of the free 
speech right).   
 233.  See id. (“The question is therefore legislative, and only becomes justiciable when 
challenged on the ground that the statute has no reasonable relation to an existing evil.”); Boloff, 7 
P. 2d at 776 (“it is the province of the Legislature to declare what acts are injurious to the public 
welfare and to prohibit them by legislative enactment as crimes”); Lazar, 157 A. at 703 (discussing 
legislative deference in incitement cases). 
 234.  See, e.g., Boloff, 7 P. 2d at 784 (“When the threatening language has progress [sic] to the 
point that it is creating a clear and present danger of action, the state need not wait until the blow 
is struck, but may proceed to protect the public peace.”); Lazar, 157 A. at 703 (applying “clear and 
present danger” standard). 
 235.  Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 227, 232 (S. D. N.Y. 1930). 
 236.  Id.
 237.  Id. at 229. 
 238.  Trinity Methodist Church v. Fed. Radio Com., 62 F.2d 850, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1932). 
 239.  Id.
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governmental control for the public good.”240  Since the record showed that 
the broadcaster had communicated attacks on the courts, Jews, and the 
Catholic Church (among others), the court held that the agency acted in the 
public interest in denying its license renewal application.241
In another case, a federal district court upheld a criminal contempt of 
court conviction on the ground that the defendant’s publication of a series of 
articles having to do with racial politics would have the tendency or effect of 
prejudicing jurors in a pending criminal trial.242  Responding to the 
defendant’s claim that he had a right to comment on pending criminal 
proceedings, the court wrote that freedom of speech and press “are 
necessarily limited to avoid trespasses upon other rights of equal dignity.”243
The court also observed that these rights were “not paramount to other 
privileges guaranteed the citizen under the Constitution,” including the right 
to trial by jury.244
During this period, arguments about the hierarchy and status of different 
constitutional rights were already being presented to courts.  In one case, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an order enjoining a defendant, then on a 
crusade to expose the producers of oleomargarine in the state, from 
publishing lists of such producers.245  In response to the claim that the order 
violated the Free Speech Clause, the court observed: 
This argument proceeds upon the theory that the right of free 
speech, for some reason not defined, rests upon a different basis 
than other rights guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution.  
While the right of free speech may in popular estimation be 
accorded a higher rank than other rights guaranteed to the citizen 
by the Constitution, in a legal and constitutional sense the right 
of free speech is of no greater dignity than the right to life, liberty, 
property, trial by jury, freedom of conscience, and other rights 
guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution.246
Arguments about “first-class” and “second class” rights, and the 
rankings of rights, were thus already gaining some currency in the courts.  In 
this instance, the free speech right was being put “in its place” as just one 
 240.  Trinity Methodist Church, 62 F.2d at 852.
 241.  Id.
 242.  United States. v. Sullens, 36 F.2d 230, 238 (S.D. Miss. 1929). 
 243.  Id.
 244.  Id.
 245.  John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill, 247 N.W. 576, 582 (Wis. Sup Ct. 1932). 
 246.  Id.
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among many fundamental rights entitled to no greater weight than others in 
its class.  Regarding the merits of the claim, the court wrote simply: “One 
may not, under the cover of free speech, wrongfully do injury to the business 
of another.”247
Defendants in defamation and libel cases were also generally 
unsuccessful.  This was, of course, well before the Supreme Court’s decision 
in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, which required that state libel laws conform to 
First Amendment standards.248  At the time, lower courts relied on the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Gitlow, that the rights of free speech and press 
were not absolute, and held that publishers were responsible for any 
reputational harms––including harms suffered by public officials––that were 
caused by their false statements.249
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a state public nuisance 
procedure, similar to one later invalidated by the Supreme Court of the 
United States as a prior restraint, as applied to a newspaper.250  “There is no 
constitutional right,” the court explained, “to publish a fact merely because 
it is true.”251  Indulging “every reasonable presumption” in favor of the 
validity of the statute, the court concluded that the public nuisance law was 
a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power.252
One federal court of appeals reversed a criminal libel conviction against 
a newspaper which was based upon publication of a report alleging police 
misconduct.253  The decision was based on the court’s finding that the article 
did not meet the statutory definition of libel rather than any constitutional 
right or principle.254  The appeals court did find that the district court erred 
in rendering a verdict based upon its personal belief that the press had 
overstepped its proper bounds by criticizing public officers.255  However, the 
same appeals court also upheld a contempt order against the defendant, who 
had published an article criticizing the conduct of his bench trial on the libel 
charge.256
 247.  Hill, 247 N.W. at 666–67. 
 248.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 249.  See, e.g., Pentuff v. Park, 138 S.E. 616, 621–22 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1927) (upholding libel 
judgment).
 250.  State v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1928). 
 251.  Guilford, 219 N.W. at 462. 
 252.  Id. at 460, 463. 
 253.  Francis v. Virgin Islands, 11 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1926). 
 254.  Id. at 862. 
 255.  See id. at 863 (“The courts of the Virgin Islands are not instrumentalities for the regulation 
of the public press.”). 
 256.  Id. at 865. 
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Finally, during the period under review, a New York trial court 
invalidated revocation of the charter of a local chapter of the American 
Legion based upon the “spirit if not the very letter” of the state and federal 
constitutions.257  Specifically, the court concluded that the national 
organization’s revocation of the charter, based on positions the chapter took 
on matters of public concern, unreasonably inhibited the local chapter’s 
freedom of speech.258  The court did not elaborate further on the First 
Amendment issue. 
As noted earlier, firearms proponents would undoubtedly argue that the 
Court’s initial hostility to free speech claims reflects the fact that doctrines 
relating to constitutional rights––including free speech––were still in their 
infancy.  That fact would, of course, significantly limit the force of any 
argument that relied on a comparison of the success rates or records in First 
Amendment and Second Amendment cases in their respective first decades. 
That, however, is not the point of this comparative exercise.  Rather, it 
is intended to contextualize the claim that the Second Amendment has been 
specially or uniquely disfavored during its first post-recognition decade. 
Arguments about the proper rank or station of constitutional rights have 
been circulating for a very long time.  Free speech proponents once had to 
argue that the First Amendment ought not to be consigned to “second-class” 
status.  The class of fundamental rights was new and small, and free speech 
claimants were staking a claim to the top of the rights hierarchy, or at least 
equal respect and dignity. 
Relative to the Second Amendment in its initial decade, in its first post-
recognition decade, the Free Speech Clause was subject to greater 
restrictions and a much deeper level of skepticism from federal and state 
courts.  The Free Speech Clause was interpreted as protecting a non-absolute 
right that was circumscribed by a number of coverage exceptions, and 
enforced under a very deferential standard of judicial review.  As noted, 
some courts even treated litigants to lectures about how the free speech right 
was not special.  At least judged by today’s standards, during its first 
enforcement decade, freedom of speech was arguably itself a “second-class” 
right. 
There is an even more important general lesson to be drawn from the 
First Amendment’s first enforcement decade.  Fundamental rights do not 
come fully formed straight out of the box.  They develop over very long 
periods of time.  Thus, although free speech was an anemic right at its 
origins, the situation for free speech claimants began to improve somewhat 
 257.  Gallaher v. American Legion, 277 N.Y.S. 81, 85 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1934). 
 258.  Id. at 85. 
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in the decade subsequent to the one under consideration.  Claimants began 
to win some important cases, and these precedents established what would 
later become basic pillars of the modern free speech right.259  However, it 
would be another three decades before freedom of speech would became 
“fundamental” in the sense we now tend to think of it—a strong trump 
against content-based regulations of political speech, and a more general 
limitation on government efforts to censor or burden expression.260
For those presently concerned about the supposed “second-class” status 
of the Second Amendment, first decades ought to be considered mere 
snapshots in time.  They certainly do not dictate what a right will ultimately 
become.  Some rights flourish over time, as the Free Speech Clause certainly 
has in many respects.  Others do not fare as well.  The first decade of Free 
Speech Clause enforcement does not debunk but informs the “second-class” 
complaints of contemporary gun control opponents.  What the Second 
Amendment has been in its first post-recognition decade may turn out to be 
very different from what the right eventually becomes.  The Article returns 
to this theme in Part VI, its conclusion. 
2.  The Contemporary Free Speech Clause 
The free speech history lessons are notable, and lessons drawn from 
them can provide context or perspective concerning modern Second 
Amendment “second-class” claims.  However, what firearms proponents 
really seem to be after is the supposed “gold standard” treatment accorded to 
claims under the Free Speech Clause.  Measured against the modern free 
speech right, critics complain, courts have substantially disfavored the right 
to keep and bear arms.261
Insofar as the Supreme Court’s attention to free speech claims goes, 
critics have a point––but only up to a point.  The Court’s docket, particularly 
 259.  During the five years immediately following the Article’s study period, the Hughes Court 
decided a number of cases in which free speech, press, and assembly claims were successful.  See,
e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (invalidating conviction for distributing 
literature on the public streets); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (same).  It was also 
during this period that the Supreme Court indicated, in its famous footnote in United States v. 
Carolene Products, that courts ought to review burdens on First Amendment rights with special 
care.  During this period, the Court sometimes referred to First Amendment rights as “preferred.”  
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 260.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–72 (1964) (opining on the “central 
meaning” of the First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (narrowing 
the categorical exclusion for speech that incites violence). 
 261.  See, e.g., Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willet, J., dissenting) 
(“Constitutional scholars have dubbed the Second Amendment ‘the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill 
of Rights.’ As Judge Ho relates, it is spurned as peripheral, despite being just as fundamental as the 
First Amendment.”). 
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in recent years, has featured a significant number of free speech claims.262
Thus, freedom of speech has clearly not been “orphaned” by the Court, in 
the way some have argued the Second Amendment has been. 
However, several aspects of the free speech comparison are a result of 
either caricaturing free speech doctrine or misunderstanding its scope.  In 
addition to admitting various coverage exceptions, the Free Speech Clause 
actually permits a wide range of restrictions on expressive activity. 
For example, the notion that strict scrutiny is always––or even 
ordinarily––applied to free speech claims is false.  Moreover, while it is true 
that strict scrutiny is usually fatal when applied to speech regulations––as it 
has been for core burdens on Second Amendment rights––it is not the case 
that all or most speech regulations are subject to this standard.  Only laws 
that target or single out speech based on its subject matter or viewpoint––a 
relatively small category––are subject to this standard of review.263  Among 
other contexts, strict scrutiny does not apply to content-neutral time, place, 
and manner regulations, restrictions on expressive conduct, spending 
conditions that restrict speech, regulations of government employee speech, 
restrictions on the speech of public school students, many campaign finance 
regulations, and so on.264
Under modern First Amendment doctrine, an “intermediate” level of 
scrutiny frequently applies.  Under that standard, freedom of speech can be, 
and often is, outweighed by a range of governmental interests––public order, 
public safety, residential privacy, workplace efficiency, educational pursuits, 
and even pure aesthetics.265  Moreover, as in the case of other fundamental 
rights, “tiered” scrutiny is becoming a less reliable indicator of whether these 
and other interests will ultimately prevail.  Thus, in some recent free speech 
 262.  See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST
AMENDMENT (2017).  
 263.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 411–12 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to law targeting political speech). 
 264.  See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000) (recognizing right of “privacy” in 
some “confrontational settings”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (upholding federal 
funding restrictions on abortion counseling by physicians at funded programs); FCC v. Pacifica, 
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding order limiting time of day when indecent speech could be broadcast 
on the radio); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding 
restrictions on overnight camping in national parks); Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S 474, 484 (1984) 
(recognizing residential privacy and tranquility as substantial interests); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (allowing school officials to restrict speech that disrupts 
learning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 371 (1968) (upholding conviction for public 
burning of draft card). 
 265.  See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 5052 
(1987) (observing that, despite the Supreme Court’s use of language suggesting heightened scrutiny 
of time, place, and manner restrictions and content-neutral restrictions on speech mixed with action, 
the Court often applies a deferential standard in such cases). 
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cases, the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny that resembles strict 
scrutiny––and vice versa.266  Further, the Court has also developed a 
“government speech” principle that allows the state to explicitly discriminate 
against private speech—notwithstanding the general rule prohibiting 
content discrimination—where the government acts as a speaker rather than 
as a regulator of expression.267  One wonders how opponents of firearms 
restrictions would react to a similar doctrine in the Second Amendment 
context. 
Thus, not even the Free Speech Clause is always and everywhere treated 
as a “first class” fundamental right––at least according to one of the 
standards relied upon by gun rights proponents.  It is no answer to say that 
gun regulations must all be treated as “content-based” by analogy to the Free 
Speech Clause and thus subject to strict scrutiny.  The entire point of gun 
control laws is to address the subject matter of guns, whereas only a narrow 
class of laws offends the First Amendment’s core content-neutrality 
principle.  The same form of argument would result in treating all laws that 
regulate private property as a violation of the Takings Clause or the Due 
Process Clause, and all laws that regulate the subjects of marriage or voting 
as subject to strict scrutiny owing to the fact that these laws implicate a 
fundamental right. 
First Amendment doctrines, like those now developing around the 
Second Amendment, are far more complex and nuanced than “second-class” 
claimants often suggest.  The demand for strict scrutiny for all regulations of 
Second Amendment rights is not a plea for parity with the Free Speech 
Clause.  Rather, it is an argument for a baseline of judicial scrutiny that does 
not apply to any other fundamental constitutional right, including freedom 
of speech. 
To be sure, despite the foregoing limitations, the Free Speech Clause is 
special.  For a variety of reasons unique to its text, history, and cultural 
salience, the free speech right has expansionist tendencies.268  Although the 
Court long ago abandoned the label “preferred” as it relates to freedom of 
speech, in some respects the Free Speech Clause remains first among equals.  
 266.  See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct 2518, 2531–32 (2014) (invalidating abortion 
clinic buffer law under intermediate scrutiny); Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct 1656, 1657 
(2015) (upholding content-based regulation of judicial campaign speech).  See also Floyd Abrams, 
When Strict Scrutiny Ceased To Be Strict, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2015/04/s ymposium-when-strict-scrutiny-ceased-to-be-strict.  
 267.  See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 (2015) 
(concluding that specialty license plates were government speech and that state could thus 
discriminate based on content in approving them).   
 268.  See generally Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318 
(2018) (discussing the expansionist tendencies of freedom of “speech”). 
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Once we strip away arguments about strict scrutiny and particular doctrines, 
what firearms proponents seem to want is the same degree of respect and 
regard for the right to keep and bear arms that is generally accorded the 
freedom of speech.  So long as there is a preferred fundamental right in this 
sense, anything else will, by definition, look “second-class.” 
However, the quest for free speech-like specialness is problematic.  The 
modern free speech right is a function of a unique history and distinctive 
attributes.  To simplify greatly, owing to the textual and conceptual 
capaciousness of “speech” and the ubiquity of communicative activity, it is 
relatively easy to argue that laws implicate and regulate freedom of speech.  
As a result, freedom of speech has burrowed into vast and increasingly 
expansive areas of regulation, politics, and culture.  Further, free speech 
rights have long been a cornerstone of American democracy.  They have 
facilitated social movements, political mobilization, and broad constitutional 
change.269
Over time, the currency of free speech arguments and their influence on 
social and political discourse have contributed to what Fred Schauer calls the 
“magnetism” of the Free Speech Clause.270  Owing to their salience and 
influence, free speech claims seem to be irresistible to litigants and judges.  
In these general respects, then, free speech is indeed special.  It is little 
wonder, then, that proponents of gun rights––along with advocates and 
defenders of equal protection, free exercise, and other constitutional 
rights—have frequently invoked the Free Speech Clause as a model and as 
a means of enforcement.271  Like the free speech right, proponents of gun 
rights and other fundamental rights claim that their right is antecedent––a 
necessary condition for the enjoyment of other rights.272
The quest by firearms proponents for free speech-like specialness raises 
important questions about the modern conception of both rights.  The Free 
Speech Clause’s magnetism poses some acute problems for the system of 
constitutional rights.  For example, critics have argued that the free speech 
right crowds out other arguments, colonizes other areas of law, alters non-
free speech constitutional doctrines, and threatens broad regulatory 
agendas.273  To be sure, the Second Amendment would not likely pose the 
 269.  See ZICK, supra note 86, at ch. 5 (discussing the role of freedom of speech in the Civil 
Rights Movement). 
 270.  See Schauer, supra note 194.  
 271.  See generally ZICK, supra note 86. 
 272.  Id. at 6 (explaining free speech antecedence). 
 273.  There is an expansive, and growing, literature devoted to these problems.  See, e.g.,
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 176–82 (2016) (discussing the Free 
Speech Clause’s deregulatory power); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WILL.
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same set of problems were it to act like the Free Speech Clause.  However, 
an exalted Second Amendment could pose some unique problems of its own.  
It could, as some have suggested, distort constitutional discourse and deter 
reasonable gun control measures.274  Broad interpretations of public carry 
rights could also inhibit free speech and assembly, or complicate law 
enforcement.275  Owing to these and other concerns, some might argue that 
instead of leveling the Second Amendment up to make it as special as free 
speech, we ought to consider leveling the Free Speech Clause down.
The analogy firearms rights proponents have drawn to freedom of 
speech is more complicated than is often appreciated.  The history of the free 
speech right shows that in its first decade, freedom of speech was a rather 
anemic fundamental right.  Judged according to contemporary standards, 
courts have not subjected Second Amendment claims to foreign or 
disfavored doctrinal rules but rather have applied doctrines that in many 
respects resemble those applied in free speech contexts.  Moreover, the fact 
that the Second Amendment has not (yet) attained the same veneration and 
magnetism as the Free Speech Clause does not mark it as “second-class.”  
Any difference in status or magnetism relates more to the unique experiences 
and attributes of the free speech right than to any grand conspiracy—judicial
or otherwise—to deprive the Second Amendment of its rightful place in the 
hierarchy of fundamental rights. 
D.  “Orphaned,” Abandoned, and Neglected Constitutional 
Rights
One final complaint, associated most closely with Justice Thomas, is 
that the Supreme Court has abandoned the Second Amendment by failing to 
review lower court decisions and elaborate on its meaning.276  As noted 
earlier, now that the Court has granted certiorari in a Second Amendment 
case, that claim will itself have to be abandoned.277  Still, the concept of 
abandoning or orphaning fundamental rights merits some attention. 
Although we do not know why the Supreme Court accepted review in the 
& MARY L. REV. 1199 (2015) (critiquing the tendency of the Free Speech Clause to colonize other 
areas of law).  
 274.  See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 10. 
 275.  See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 104 IOWA L. REV. 223 (2018) 
(discussing intersection between free speech and Second Amendment rights in context of public 
protests and demonstrations); Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 
(2015) (discussing intersection between Fourth Amendment and open carry laws). 
 276.  See, e.g., Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
right to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court’s constitutional orphan.”). 
 277.  See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), 
cert. granted. 2019 WL 271961.
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recent case, it may have done so out of a concern that it was shirking its 
constitutional duty to elaborate on the meaning of a constitutional right.  
Correcting that misperception may influence how much ground the Court 
thinks it needs to make up.  This Section examines what it means to say that 
a constitutional right has been orphaned, abandoned, or neglected.  It shows 
that the Second Amendment has not been subjected to any untoward or 
exceptional treatment in this regard either, particularly relative to how other 
fundamental constitutional rights have been treated by the Court. 
Of course, nothing compelled the Court to take any Second Amendment 
cases.  There are non-abdication explanations for the Court’s failure to 
review gun rights claims for the past decade.  Perhaps there was some 
uncertainty on the Court regarding how the Second Amendment’s doctrinal 
rules ought to be constructed.  Allowing lower courts to sort these rules out 
in the first instance could be very helpful in terms of future decisions and 
interpretations.  Or perhaps the justices could not agree on a proper case to 
take, or circuit split to address, or were concerned about how their colleagues 
might interpret the Second Amendment.278  They may also have been aware 
that the political process has generally produced robust protection for gun 
rights, thus reducing the need for judicial action.  Or they may have been 
concerned that a broad interpretation of the Second Amendment, for instance 
one relating to public carry rights, could have negative consequences in 
terms of public safety.  All of these factors, and others, likely reduced the 
incentives for Supreme Court intervention. 
There is no established standard or metric for determining whether or 
when the Court has orphaned, abandoned, or neglected a constitutional right.  
If orphaning a right means to permanently abandon it, that is clearly not the 
case with regard to the Second Amendment.  It seems likely that the Court 
will continue to add Second Amendment cases to its future docket. 
As the life cycle of other fundamental rights shows, a decade-long 
silence does not a constitutional orphan make.  Moreover, fundamental rights 
can be abandoned or neglected at birth, only to be reunited with the family 
of fundamental rights later on.  Finally, in terms of doctrinal neglect, the 
Second Amendment has not suffered nearly the long-term effects that other 
rights, or certain aspects of them, have experienced. 
It might make sense to think of the Second Amendment as having been 
“orphaned” or abandoned during the long era prior to Heller, during which 
the Court failed to recognize an individual right to keep and bear arms.  On 
this view, Heller actually rescued the Second Amendment from its initial 
abandonment.  We might say the same thing about the Free Speech Clause, 
 278.  See Levinson, supra note 14, at 23–24 (discussing reasons for the Court’s reticence). 
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which the Court essentially abandoned until the first quarter of the twentieth 
century when it addressed World War I era sedition cases.  Judged according 
to this historical standard, a decade––or even three––of silence pales in 
comparison to the abandonment of these provisions in their early years. 
The true orphans of the Constitution, it would seem, are those that have 
been forever abandoned or effectively banished from the class of 
fundamental rights.  There are several obvious examples.  Owing to its 
effective abandonment, one commentator has dubbed the Third Amendment, 
which restricts the quartering of soldiers in private homes, “the Rodney 
Dangerfield of the Bill of Rights.”279  Judge Robert Bork famously dismissed 
the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights not enumerated elsewhere in 
the Constitution as an “inkblot.”280  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges 
and Immunities Clause was effectively abandoned in 1873, when the 
Slaughterhouse-House Cases held that it did not protect a broad range of 
fundamental rights.281
Moreover, certain fundamental rights have been orphaned or abandoned 
through absorption or collapse into other provisions.  The equality and 
substantive rights aspects of the Privileges and Immunities Clause are now 
performed by the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, 
respectively.  Looking to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has not 
based any decision on the Assembly Clause in more than three decades.282
Ditto the Petition Clause, which the Court long appended to the Assembly 
Clause before turning it into a right of expressive association.283  The Press 
Clause has received more attention from the Court, but like the assembly and 
 279.  See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Foreword: The Third Amendment in the 21st Century, 82 
TENN. L. REV.  491, 491 (2015) (“For many years, the Third Amendment to the Constitution has 
been the Rodney Dangerfield of the Bill of Rights, getting no respect.”).
 280.  Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative to Substantive Due 
Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 97–98 (2000) (quoting 
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 117 (1989) (testimony of Robert Bork), 
reprinted in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT 441 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993)). 
 281.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).  The Court did rely on the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), which held that the right to interstate 
travel was protected by the provision.  However, it has refused to re-engage with the clause in other 
respects, including incorporation of fundamental rights.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742 (2010). 
 282.  See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1098 (2016). 
 283.  See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
(2012).
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petition rights the Court has more or less collapsed freedom of the press into 
the Free Speech Clause.284
To be sure, the Court has not altogether ignored these “expressive” 
rights.  Some decisions have at least referenced the Assembly Clause.285
However, the Court has not expressly elaborated or constructed the meaning 
of the Assembly Clause, or accepted “Assembly Clause” cases for review.  
Further, the Court has often written about the values served by a free press; 
but that has not resulted in any distinctive interpretations of freedom of the 
press.286  Finally, the Court has indicated that the Petition Clause more or 
less overlaps with the Free Speech Clause, and declined to elaborate further.  
The general approach has been to collapse all of these rights into a fictional 
“Free Expression Clause.”287
Thus, some enumerated constitutional rights have indeed been 
orphaned or abandoned by the Supreme Court.  However, the Second 
Amendment has not experienced anything like this kind of treatment.  The 
Court has clearly not forever abandoned the provision or abdicated its role 
as the final interpreter of its meaning.  Even before the recent grant, the 
Supreme Court had not treated the Second Amendment as anachronistic, 
indecipherable, or ancillary to some other constitutional right. 
The real complaint appears to be that the Court has neglected the 
Second Amendment by failing to address its meaning during the past decade.  
Free Speech Clause proponents could have made a similar argument during 
the decades after that provision was recognized as a fundamental right.  As 
discussed earlier, in the first decade the Court accepted only three cases for 
review, and its decisions did not add anything of substance to the 
interpretation of the free speech right. 
Recognizing a fundamental right and subsequently failing to elaborate 
its meaning is a rather mild form of neglect when judged according to the 
experience of other rights and aspects of those rights.  For example, the 
Supreme Court first interpreted the Free Exercise Clause in 1878, in 
Reynolds v. United States.288  Reviewing a federal prosecution for bigamy, 
the Court narrowly construed the free exercise right to prohibit Congress 
from restricting or punishing a person’s religious beliefs, but to permit it to 
broadly regulate conduct through criminal and other laws.  Twelve years 
 284.  See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 
YALE L.J. 412, 416 (2013).   
 285.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 286.  See Sonja West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011). 
 287.  ZICK, supra note 86, at 77–78. 
 288.  98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
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later, in dicta, the Court reaffirmed the belief/conduct distinction.289  And 
there matters stood, until the Court incorporated the free exercise right in the 
1940s.290  It would be another two decades before the Court finally 
abandoned the belief/conduct distinction and adopted a form of heightened 
scrutiny for free exercise claims.291  If neglect is measured in decades, the 
Second Amendment has a very long way to go. 
Other constitutional rights have suffered from extensive post-
recognition neglect.  For example, the Court suggested in the 1960s, and then 
again in the 1980s, that there is a right of “intimate association.”292  However, 
in the ensuing decades, it has not elaborated on the scope or substance of the 
right.293  The right sometimes makes a cameo appearance, as it did in the 
Court’s recent marriage equality decision, but otherwise remains a 
mystery.294
The Court has also neglected, for varying periods, specific aspects or 
dimensions of fundamental rights.  This has been true of several aspects of 
the Free Speech Clause.  For example, although the Court held in 1969 that 
public school students enjoyed free speech rights, it did not elaborate on 
those rights for almost two decades.295  During the 1960s, the Court indicated 
that public university students enjoy robust free speech rights.296  However, 
the Court has not taken many free speech cases in that context since.  As a 
result, it has largely been left to lower courts to ascertain, for example, what 
constitutional standard applies to student speech and how the First 
Amendment applies more generally on public university campuses.297
Finally, again in the free speech area, in 1942 the Court cast “purely 
 289.  See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
 290.  Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 291.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405–06 (1963). 
 292.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (relying on marital association to 
invalidate restrictions on distribution and receipt of contraceptive information); Roberts v. Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609 (1984) (referring to the right, but not elaborating upon it). 
 293.  See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) 
(tracing the origins of the right but noting that its parameters are unclear). 
 294.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599–600 (2015) (observing that same-sex 
couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association).
 295.  See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 296.  See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).  The Court has addressed issues 
relating to recognition of student groups and funding issues. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); 
Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Board of Regents v. 
Southworth, 526 U.S. 1038 (1999).  However, none of these precedents address standards specific 
to university student speech.   
 297.  See John D. Inazu, The Purpose (and Limits) of the University, UTAH L. REV. (2018); 
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1801 
(2017).
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commercial advertising” outside the domain of the First Amendment.298
There it languished until 1976, when the Court concluded that commercial 
speech was entitled to some First Amendment protection.299
There are other examples of rights, or aspects of rights, that the Court 
has neglected for far longer than a decade if not abandoned altogether.  Since 
2008, the Supreme Court has essentially left it to lower courts to flesh out 
the meaning of the right to habeas corpus in cases involving suspected 
terrorists.300  The original Constitution contains a prohibition on state 
impairment of contracts.301  However, the Court’s early interpretation of this 
provision led to the right’s effective abandonment or at least its severe 
neglect in subsequent decades.302
Judged in relation to these examples, the Court’s initial silence 
regarding Second Amendment rights has been neither unusual nor a cause 
for marked concern.  It is not indicative of the kind of abandonment or severe 
neglect that other fundamental rights have experienced.  A decade is not a 
very long time in terms of the life span of a constitutional right.  In 
comparative terms, the argument that the Court had “orphaned” the Second 
Amendment or subjected it to severe neglect was at least premature. It should 
not encourage or suggest making up for lost ground in future Second 
Amendment cases. 
Conclusion – The Second Amendment’s Second Act 
The principal burden of this Article has been to assess the merits of 
various claims that the Second Amendment, as it has been interpreted and 
enforced, is a “second-class” constitutional right.  As the foregoing analysis 
shows, fundamental rights are dynamic constructs.  As the experiences of the 
Free Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and other fundamental rights 
suggest, what the Second Amendment has been in its first decade will not 
determine what it will become in its second decade and beyond. 
The dynamics that affect constitutional rights tend to play out over the 
course of long periods of time, and in response to a variety of influences and 
circumstances.303  As Professor Jack Balkin has observed: 
 298.  Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).  
 299.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761–62 
(1976).
 300.  See Levinson, supra note 14, at 24 (suggesting that the Court has been absent from the 
debate over habeas corpus rights of alleged enemy aliens after Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008)).
 301.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §10. 
 302.  Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 303.  See generally ZICK, supra note 86. 
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Rights are not simply a fixed set of protections that the state 
affords or fails to afford.  Rights are a terrain of struggle in a 
world of continuous change—a site of ongoing controversies, a 
battleground where the shape and contours of the terrain are 
remade with each victory.  Rights, and particularly fundamental 
rights, far from being fixed and immovable, are moving targets.  
They are worth fighting over because the discourse of rights has 
power and because that discourse can be reshaped and is 
reshaped through intellectual debate and political struggle.304
Fundamental rights can retract or expand, depending on their unique 
dynamics.  The right to contraception, which was first characterized as an 
aspect of the privacy of the marital relationship, was extended to unmarried 
persons and then to minors.305  The scope of the right to abortion, first 
recognized in Roe, was diminished as a result of the Court’s decision in 
Casey.
Fundamental rights can also experience peaks and valleys.  Think of the 
wild ride of the Free Exercise Clause, which started out as a narrow ban on 
suppression of belief, morphed into a fundamental right protected under 
heightened judicial scrutiny, and is now once again a relatively narrow 
prohibition on certain types of discriminatory measures.306
As discussed, freedom of speech offers still another case study in the 
transformation of fundamental rights.  From its humble beginnings, the free 
speech right has vaulted all the way to the top of the fundamental rights 
hierarchy.  The change in status was a result of decades of activism, 
litigation, political and cultural upheaval, public discourse, and doctrinal 
change.
Firearms proponents who are presently concerned about the status of 
the right to keep and bear arms can take some comfort in these 
transformation narratives.  Heller’s legacy has thus far not been what 
firearms rights proponents––and, frankly, opponents––had expected.  
However, the Second Amendment will not become an “inkblot.”  It is not 
going to be collapsed into some other constitutional right, or abandoned for 
all time.  Indeed, its second act, in terms of Supreme Court review, is just 
 304.  Balkin, supra note 54, at 53–54. 
 305.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483; Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 
U.S. 678 (1977). 
 306.  Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963) (applying heightened scrutiny to 
free exercise claim), with Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (declining to apply heightened scrutiny to certain free exercise claims). 
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beginning.  The Second Amendment seems likely to retain its “A-list” status, 
and may even improve its position in the hierarchy of fundamental rights. 
Predictions are perilous.  However, it seems likely that the Supreme 
Court will ultimately recognize some form of Second Amendment right to 
carry firearms in public.  It may also invalidate certain burdensome 
restrictions on non-core aspects of the Second Amendment, including those 
that limit self-defense outside the home.  It also seems likely to eventually 
address the issue of whether the Second Amendment allows states to ban 
assault-style rifles or other types of arms.  Given the current makeup of the 
Court, it does not seem a stretch to predict that in its second decade the 
Second Amendment’s scope will expand––perhaps to a considerable degree. 
Of course, it is also possible that the Second Amendment will 
experience a different sort of life cycle.  There may be peaks and valleys.  
The right to keep and bear arms may expand incrementally.  Along with 
notable victories, firearms proponents may experience some setbacks.  As it 
decides on the proper course, the Supreme Court ought not to do so under 
the mistaken impression that the Second Amendment and the Heller decision 
are targets of resistance, hostility, or rebellion in the lower courts.  They 
ought not to feel hurried to stem a tide of resistance that does not exist, or to 
correct a course not actually traveled.  There is no constitutional “orphan” to 
rescue. 
The Second Amendment is not now, and is not likely to be, a “second-
class” fundamental right.  Its fate will ultimately depend on the dynamic 
influences that have affected other fundamental rights and situated them 
within our dynamic system of constitutional rights.  In its second decade and 
beyond, as the Second Amendment becomes a permanent member of the 
class or family of fundamental constitutional rights, the process of 
normalizing the right to keep and bear arms––politically, doctrinally, and 
theoretically––will continue to unfold in the ordinary course.  That process 
ought not to be influenced by a desire to over-compensate for purported lost 
opportunities or lost time. 
